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Well, the show sure ended with a bang.  On the last day of the 
Term, the Court — for the first time ever, by a single vote, over vigor-
ous dissents, and against the weight of circuit precedent — wielded the 
Second Amendment to strike down a federal gun control measure and 
to declare a robust individual right to use firearms for self-defense. 
Experts began parsing District of Columbia v. Heller1 within hours 
of the Court’s pronouncement.  Over the ensuing weeks, sophisticated 
commentary blossomed in a rich profusion of blogs, wikis, posts, 
threads, and chats.  Now, nearly five months after the decision, does 
anything remain to be said?  In the Internet Age, does anyone still 
read law reviews?  They seem so twentieth-century. 
Yet the Justices apparently still do look at law reviews.  Almost 
half the cases decided with signed opinions last Term cited at least one 
law review article.2  In Heller itself, the various opinions invoked over 
a dozen articles, including a 1940 classic from the Harvard Law Re-
view.3  Indeed, last Term was a banner year not just for gun wielders 
like Dick Heller, but also for the editors of the Harvard Law Review.   
All told, the Justices cited fifteen different HLR articles — more than 
double the article count of any other legal periodical.4 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University.  Special thanks to 
Bruce Ackerman, Vik Amar, Will Baude, John Donohue, Lindsey Worth, and the members of the 
Harvard Law School faculty workshop. 
 1 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 2 Throughout this Comment, I shall use the word “article” to refer generically to all signifi-
cant law review items, including notes, comments, essays, and book reviews. 
 3 128 S. Ct. at 2832 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia 
Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 182 (1940)).  Wiener’s is the only article cited 
by the various opinions in Heller that had previously been invoked by a Court majority.  See Per-
pich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 341 (1990); Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 
41, 46 (1965).  Wiener is also the only journal author cited in Heller who wrote before the out-
pouring of modern Second Amendment scholarship, an outpouring that began in earnest with a 
provocative article authored by Don Kates in 1983.  See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition 
and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983).  Following in 
the footsteps of a prophetic 1997 concurrence by Justice Thomas, the Heller majority cited this 
notable Kates article with approval.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.2 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); Heller, 128 S. Ct. at  2803.    
 4 The next highest article count was from the Yale Law Journal and the Michigan Law Re-
view, each with seven.  
  One particular HLR article was cited in two different cases last term.  See John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 759 n.6 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing O.W. 
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Perhaps the Court pays particular attention to HLR because  
HLR has traditionally returned the compliment, famously beginning 
every Volume with an entire issue devoted exclusively to the Court’s 
most recent work product and typically featuring in the remaining 
seven issues a rich smorgasbord of scholarship suitable for judicial 
consumption. 
Remarkably, four former HLR staff members — John Roberts, An-
tonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer — now sit on 
the very Court they once helped analyze as student editors.  No other 
law review can point to four alums who have ever served on the Court, 
much less four former editors sitting together as Justices.  And the next 
round of Justices may well be picked by Barack Obama, who first rose 
to national attention as HLR President.5 
Nor is HLR’s influence confined to those who once served on this 
review.  Justice Stevens, for example, though not a Harvard Law Re-
view alum, is evidently a loyal reader.  Not only did he cite to HLR  
in Heller itself, but during the Term as a whole he invoked almost  
as many HLR articles (seven) as were cited by all his colleagues  
combined. 
In this Comment, I refract Heller through the prism of HLR by 
paying particular attention to the aforementioned HLR alums and 
HLR’s loyal reader, Justice Stevens.6  I conclude that no member of 
the HLR group offered a sufficiently holistic account of certain impor-
tant methodological and substantive issues implicated by the Heller 
debate.  Methodologically, no member of the HLR group persuasively 
explained how the Court should proceed when established case law 
collides with the clear meaning of the Constitution itself.  Substan-
tively, members of the HLR group scanted various amendments  
beyond the Second even though three of these amendments — the 
Ninth, the Fourteenth, and the Nineteenth — are in fact key to a full 
understanding of what “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” 
properly means in America today.  The HLR group’s failure to high-
light the Fourteenth Amendment is particularly notable because this 
failure has a fascinating history starring the Harvard Law Review itself 
and leading mid-twentieth-century figures closely associated with this 
periodical. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. 
Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (same). 
 5 See Fox Butterfield, First Black Elected To Head Harvard’s Law Review, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
6, 1990, at A20. 
 6 I admit that this is an artificial — indeed cutesy — way of organizing my analysis.  As will 
become clear soon enough, while I have framed my remarks around six persons with special links 
to this Review, I have not hesitated to weave into my analysis discussion of other jurists where 
appropriate. 
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I.  THE DUELISTS: SCALIA AND STEVENS 
In 1959–1960, Antonin Scalia served as Notes Editor for Volume 73 
of the Harvard Law Review.7  In 2008, he delivered what history may 
well deem his most memorable opinion, writing for a five-Justice ma-
jority in the biggest Second Amendment case ever decided.  John Paul 
Stevens, the Court’s Senior Associate Justice, wrote the lead dissent for 
himself and three others.8 
A.  Constitutional Method in Heller:  
The Document and the Doctrine 
Justice Scalia’s landmark ruling merits our attention for its method 
as well as its result.  Behold: a constitutional opinion that actually 
dwells on the Constitution itself! 
Most constitutional opinions do not do this.  Constitutional cases 
nowadays typically involve the application of settled constitutional 
precepts that all parties accept as binding.  In such cases, there is usu-
ally no occasion for the opinion writer to discourse at length on the 
Constitution’s text, history, and structure.  Even when open constitu-
tional questions work their way up through the lower courts to the 
Supreme Court, the resulting opinions rarely lavish attention on the 
Constitution’s words and original meaning.  Rather, these opinions of-
ten focus more on judicial doctrine — the multi-pronged tests, the tiers 
of scrutiny, the standards of review, and other implementing formulas 
and frameworks found in prior judicial rulings.9 
At times the Constitution’s language can come to resemble a pea 
covered by a stack of judicial mattresses — a grain of sand no longer 
visible, though presumably resting deep inside the pearl of judicial 
elaboration.  The majority opinion in Roe v. Wade,10 for example, 
never even quoted the constitutional clause that the Court used to 
reach its sweeping result.  In countless cases involving application of 
the Bill of Rights against the states, the operative Fourteenth Amend-
ment text has received little or no mention.11 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 The other Notes Editor for Volume 73 was Frank Michelman.  John D. French was HLR 
President that year. 
 8 The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion; Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens’s dissent.  Justice Breyer 
also delivered a separate dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.  For analysis 
of this Breyer dissent, see infra section II.B, pp. 182–87.  
 9 Where direct and extensive analysis of the Constitution’s text, history, and structure does 
occur in the United States Reports, it is often found in dissents or concurrences. 
 10 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 11 Even when the Justices have explicitly invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, they 
have almost never paused to explain how a clause that speaks of “due process” is properly read to 
require states to honor various nonprocedural rights such as the free exercise of religion or the 
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By contrast, in Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion, the textual pea 
swelled to the size of a boulder that no prior judicial mattress could 
cover up.  The Second Amendment’s grain of sand became an entire 
world inviting a fresh and detailed exploration.  
After briefly summarizing the facts of the case — in which a pri-
vate citizen, Dick Heller, asserted a constitutional right to keep a 
loaded handgun at his D.C. home notwithstanding the District’s 
sweeping gun control ordinance — Justice Scalia “turn[ed] first to the 
meaning of the Second Amendment.”12  He began by quoting in full 
the Amendment’s text.13 
After the quote came the quest.  Justice Scalia announced that he 
sought to understand the Amendment’s text as it was understood or 
would have been understood by “ordinary citizens in the founding 
generation.”14  He then took the reader on an extended journey 
through Constitution-land.15  The journey began with page after page 
of close textual analysis and a review of eighteenth-century legal and 
linguistic sources.16  After that, Justice Scalia devoted another long 
chunk of his opinion to analogous language in “state constitutions that 
preceded and immediately followed adoption of the Second Amend-
ment”; to the Amendment’s drafting history; and to its subsequent in-
terpretation in the nineteenth century.17  All these sources, Justice 
Scalia concluded, cohere to establish a clear “individual right to use 
arms for self-defense.”18 
Only at this late juncture did Justice Scalia turn to the Supreme 
Court’s Second Amendment precedents.  His doctrinal discussion oc-
cupied just a few pages,19 and even before it began, he made clear that 
the burden of proof had already shifted in Dick Heller’s favor.  Thus, 
Heller did not need to show that the best reading of the Court’s case 
law strongly or even weakly supported his position.  Rather, “[w]e now 
ask whether any of our precedents forecloses the conclusions we have 
reached about the meaning of the Second Amendment”20 — conclu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
entitlement to just compensation (or the right of privacy, for that matter).  The best textual ap-
proach is to use the Fourteenth Amendment’s companion Privileges or Immunities Clause, but the 
Court has only rarely invoked this grand provision.  For more discussion, see infra pp. 175–77.  
See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
163–80 (1998). 
 12 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Cf. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring, with style, to 
“Apprendi-land”). 
 16 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788–2802. 
 17 Id. at 2802; see also id. at 2802–12. 
 18 Id. at 2803. 
 19 See id. at 2812–16. 
 20 Id. at 2812 (emphasis added). 
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sions, to repeat, based on Justice Scalia’s direct engagement of consti-
tutional text, history, and structure on a virtually clean analytic slate.21 
In his spirited dissent, Justice Stevens took potshots at Justice 
Scalia’s methodology, but most of these projectiles missed their mark.  
In various passages, Justice Stevens can be read to suggest that even if 
Justice Scalia were correct about the Second Amendment’s text and 
original understanding, Dick Heller still should have lost because of 
the pull of precedent. 
Precedent encompasses several elements.  Let us consider each 
component with care. 
1.  Vertical Precedent. — First, vertical precedent reflects the insti-
tutional hierarchy set forth in the Constitution itself, which establishes 
one court designed as “supreme” over all other courts.22  These subor-
dinate courts include all other Article III tribunals, which the Consti-
tution explicitly describes as “inferior to” the Supreme Court,23 and 
also state courts whose rulings are subject to reversal by the Supreme 
Court in “all Cases” arising under federal law.24  Thus, Supreme Court 
precedent properly binds all other courts: as a rule, a lower court judge 
should follow the Constitution as the Supreme Court understands the 
Constitution even if she thinks (and has good legal reasons for think-
ing) that the higher Court’s understanding is erroneous.  
With this quick refresher in mind, consider one of Justice Stevens’s 
main precedent-based arguments, namely, his repeated reminder that 
all the federal circuit court cases decided between 1939 and 2000 re-
jected the approach now championed by Justice Scalia.25  So what?  
Lower court rulings do not oblige the Supreme Court to ignore what 
the Court now believes to be the best reading of the Constitution itself.  
Inferior court rulings are in general merely persuasive authorities, enti-
tled to interpretive weight depending on factors such as the intrinsic 
strength of their arguments, the legal reputations of their authors, the 
number of judges opining on the issue, and the degree of consensus 
among these judges.26  On one hand, a lawyerly lower court opinion 
might be weightier than, say, an article in the Harvard Law Review 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Justice Scalia ultimately concluded that the key precedent actually tended to support Dick 
Heller’s claim.  See infra p. 165.  
 22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
 23 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 24 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 25 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823 & n.2, 2844 n.38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 26 Lower court rulings might also sometimes give rise to reliance interests that the Supreme 
Court should properly take into account.  The reliance issue is discussed in more detail infra sec-
tion I.A.3, pp. 156–61.  As we shall see, none of the lower court cases invoked by Justice Stevens 
created any reliance interests that should properly prevent today’s Supreme Court from enforcing 
the correct meaning of the Constitution.   
  
150 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:145  
because lower court judges have their minds wonderfully concentrated 
by concrete facts, real-world stakes, adversarial presentations, and col-
legial deliberation within a multi-member panel.  On the other hand, 
these judges may not be scholarly experts on the Constitution’s text 
and history, whereas some HLR authors may plausibly claim to pos-
sess this expertise. 
Also, in many cases lower courts are not even trying to directly en-
gage the Constitution, but are instead simply parsing the Court’s case 
law — something that the Court thinks it can usually do quite well on 
its own, thank you.  Most of the circuit cases invoked by Justice Ste-
vens contain little independent analysis of the text and original under-
standing of the Second Amendment.  A handful of federal appellate 
cases do feature more detailed textual, structural, and historical exposi-
tions, but these cases were typically decided after the 1939–2000 period 
emphasized by Justice Stevens.  Even worse for Stevens, these recent 
rulings are a mixed bag, with several leading judges and courts en-
dorsing views similar to those of Justice Scalia.27  As merely persuasive 
authority, the general views of lower courts largely cancel out, and Jus-
tice Stevens did not dwell on the particular arguments contained in 
these lower court opinions.  His was largely a precedent-based claim 
about the sheer number of lower court judges on his side, and as such 
his claim fell flat. 
2.  Horizontal Precedent. — Just as lower court cases are entitled 
to weight as persuasive authority, so too are prior Supreme Court rul-
ings.  Here we move from vertical precedent to horizontal precedent 
— to the respect the Court properly owes its own previous judgments. 
If today’s Court seeks to follow the Constitution’s text and struc-
ture as these were publicly understood at the time of the Founding, 
current Justices would do well to study landmark rulings by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall and Justice Story with special care.  Not only were Jus-
tice Story and Chief Justice Marshall much closer in time to the en-
actment of the Constitution and its early amendments, but these two 
figures (and others, of course) have been deservedly canonized as par-
ticularly gifted constitutional guides.  However, the weight that the 
current Court properly gives to these early judicial landmarks is ulti-
mately of a persuasive sort: today’s Court should heed an earlier Court 
case precisely to the degree that today’s Justices believe that the prior 
Court was likely correct about what the Constitution meant when en-
acted and amended. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Em-
erson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).   
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But not all prior Court opinions are as impressive as Justice Story’s 
in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee28 or Chief Justice Marshall’s in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,29 and not all departed Justices deserve statues 
in the Pantheon.  Thus, a 1939 Court opinion that Justice Stevens 
brandished at every possible turn,30 United States v. Miller,31 per Jus-
tice McReynolds, simply lacked the silver bullet that Justice Stevens 
craved and claimed.  Miller was no Martin, and James McReynolds 
was no John Marshall. 
 Miller came nearly 150 years after the adoption of the Second 
Amendment, and there is little reason to believe that the Miller Jus-
tices had a dramatically clearer view of the Founding texts and events 
than do today’s Justices.  As Justice Scalia reminded us, Miller was 
decided without the benefit of full adversarial presentation.32  Nor did 
any dissenting or concurring Justice come forth to sharpen the Miller 
Court’s five-page discussion of the Second Amendment — which was 
long on quotation and citation, but short on analysis.  The Court’s 
clipped opinion33 said enough to decide the case at hand but was 
hardly a comprehensive exposition of the Second Amendment or of the 
Constitution’s general structure.34  If today’s Court believes that 
Miller misunderstood the Constitution’s original meaning, the Court 
should follow the Constitution, not the case. 
Justice Stevens tried to boost Miller’s precedential firepower in two 
ways.  First, he suggested that today’s Court may properly deviate 
from Miller and thereby introduce “a change in the law” only if the 
Court could identify some new piece of historical evidence or some 
new line of argument that the Miller Court did not consider.35 
But is a break from precedent best described as a “change in the 
law” if that break occurs because a current Court majority seeks to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 29 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 30 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822, 2823 & nn.2–3, 2824, 2829 n.10, 2836–37, 2838 n.30, 2839, 
2844 n.36, 2845–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 31 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 32 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814.  The respondent in Miller did not make an appearance at 
oral argument and did not file a brief; the Court heard only from the Solicitor General.  See id.   
 33 By “clipped” I mean both terse and filled with cut-and-pasted squibs. 
 34 See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178–82.  Justice Scalia also argued that what little Miller did say on 
balance tended to support Heller’s right to keep a handgun at home.  See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 
2813–16; see also infra p. 165.   
 35 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2836, 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For other (and slightly different) 
formulations of Justice Stevens’s claim that a break with precedent requires some “new” evidence 
or argument, see id. at 2823–24 & n.4, 2831, 2845.  It is worth repeating that Justice Scalia denied 
that he was radically departing from Miller.  He clearly approved of Miller’s outcome on Miller’s 
facts; he claimed that Miller contained language supporting Heller’s position; and he actually bor-
rowed two doctrinal formulations from Miller in his effort to specify which sorts of guns are pro-
tected by the Second Amendment.  See id. at 2813–16 (majority opinion). 
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abide by the Constitution’s original meaning?  Strictly speaking, the 
Constitution itself is the law — the supreme law — and when today’s 
Court enforces the dictates of the Constitution, the Court is in the most 
fundamental sense not changing the law, but obeying it.36  The now-
superseded case did not itself create any law.37  Rather, the old case 
merely attempted to declare what the law of the Constitution already 
was.  If this declaration was, in the view of today’s Court, based on a 
demonstrably mistaken reading of the Constitution, then repudiation 
of this mistake is rooted in the Constitution itself. 
This classical vision of the judicial function was powerfully articu-
lated by Justice Scalia in an influential 1990 meditation on legal retro-
activity in American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith,38 and this vision has 
laid the conceptual foundation for several of Justice Scalia’s most no-
table majority opinions prior to Heller.  In particular, his 2004 opinion 
in Crawford v. Washington39 explicitly overruled a prior Court case in 
order to bring Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause case law into 
alignment with the text and original meaning of that clause.40 
Just last Term, in one of the Court’s most magisterial majority 
opinions, Justice Stevens himself embraced and embellished Justice 
Scalia’s classical vision.  (The opinion also highlighted a trio of HLR 
articles analyzing the practical and jurisprudential issues raised when 
case law shifts.41)  It is worth quoting Justice Stevens’s rich opinion for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 At the end of his opinion, Justice Stevens appeared to recognize this truth: “The Court con-
cludes its opinion by declaring that it is not the proper place of this Court to change the meaning 
of rights ‘enshrine[d]’ in the Constitution.”  Id. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting id. at 2822 (majority opinion)).  Justice Stevens responded by arguing that the ma-
jority had simply misconstrued the original meaning and had failed to carry its burden “as a mat-
ter of text or history.”  “[T]he right the Court announces was not ‘enshrined’ in the Second 
Amendment by the Framers; it is the product of today’s law-changing decision.”  Id.  This is a 
quite different — and, as we shall see below, much more plausible — critique, alleging not that 
the Court has ignored precedents such as Miller, but rather that it has misinterpreted the Consti-
tution’s original meaning.   
 37 It may, however, have created reliance interests.  See infra section I.A.3, pp. 156–61.  
 38 See 496 U.S. 167, 200–05 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 39 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 40 Id. at 60, 68 (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).  Justice Thomas also deserves 
special notice here as the first member of the Court to identify the pre-Crawford mismatch be-
tween the Sixth Amendment’s actual words and the Court’s Sixth Amendment doctrine and to 
propose a proper corrective.  See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358–66 (1992) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 41 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 n.6 (2008) (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality 
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959)); see also id. at 1038 (citing Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 
Term—Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965)). 
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the Court in Danforth v. Minnesota42 at length because it seems in ten-
sion with his Heller dissent, issued only four months later: 
 
Our interpretation of that basic Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 
has evolved over the years. 
  In Crawford we accepted the petitioner’s argument that the interpreta-
tion of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation that we had previously 
endorsed . . . needed reconsideration because it “stray[ed] from the original 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”  We “turn[ed] to the historical 
background of the Clause to understand its meaning,” and relied primarily 
on legal developments that had occurred prior to the adoption of the Sixth 
Amendment to derive the correct interpretation.  We held that the “Consti-
tution prescribes a procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in 
criminal trials, and we, no less than the state courts, lack authority to re-
place it with one of our own devising.” 
  Thus, our opinion in Crawford announced a “new rule” — as that term 
is defined in [our case law] — because the result in [Crawford] “was not 
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction be-
came final.” It was not, however, a rule “of our own devising” or the prod-
uct of our own views about sound policy. . . .  
. . . . 
 . . . As we have already explained, the source of a “new rule” is the Consti-
tution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law.  Accord-
ingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new 
rule. . . .  
. . . . 
Cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment).43 
 
Justice Stevens, meet Justice Stevens.  The Danforth Stevens did 
not oppose breaking with a precedent that “stray[ed] from the original 
meaning” of the Sixth Amendment.  Indeed, the Danforth Stevens 
quoted with approval the Court’s originalist language from Crawford 
(an opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Stevens) 
asserting that the Court in general “lack[s] authority” to depart from 
the text and original understanding of the Sixth Amendment.  But the 
Heller Stevens wrapped himself in the robes of precedent and argued 
that even if precedent has strayed from the original meaning, prece-
dent should be followed.  Apparently, the Court has general authority 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008) (holding that state courts on collateral review of state convictions are  
free to give retroactive effect to new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure where fed-
eral courts would not do so under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).   
 43 Id. at 1035 & n.5 (internal citations omitted). 
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to depart from the original understanding of some amendments but 
not others.44 
This brings us to the big problem with Justice Stevens’s methodo-
logical assault on Justice Scalia: the Justice Stevens of Heller suggested 
that even if a precedent got the Constitution’s original meaning wrong, 
the precedent (here, United States v. Miller) should still be followed so 
long as the precedent-setting Court was fully aware of the contrary 
evidence and arguments.  In order to overrule a prior Court case, said 
Justice Stevens, the Court must identify some new item that was not 
brought to the attention of the precedent-setting Court.  
 But no constitutional clause says anything of the sort.  On the con-
trary, the Constitution’s text explicitly and unqualifiedly proclaims it-
self “the supreme Law of the Land”45 — supreme over any contrary 
statute, or executive order, or judicial precedent.  So Justice Stevens’s 
suggestion cannot be defended textually. 
How about structurally?  Justice Stevens failed to mount any struc-
tural defense of his insistence on “new evidence,” and it is hard to 
imagine what a persuasive structural argument might look like.  The 
Constitution creates three coordinate branches of government.  True, 
the Supreme Court was designed to be supreme over other courts — 
but not to lord over other branches, and surely not over the Constitu-
tion itself.  No one thinks that when Congress enacts an unconstitu-
tional statute, that statute is sacrosanct so long as Congress considered 
and erroneously rejected all the constitutional objections.  Nor does 
anyone think that the President may generally act in ways that 
squarely violate the Constitution’s text and original understanding, so 
long as the Office of Legal Counsel considered everything before 
wrongly giving the President the green light.  Why should a Court de-
cision that got the constitutional issue wrong be treated differently? 
Justice Stevens failed to answer this question.  Indeed, he failed 
even to ask it. 
Justice Stevens apparently believed that his “new evidence” test de-
rives from precedent itself.  But he has simply misread the precedents.  
He quoted bland language from the 1986 case of Vasquez v. Hillery,46 
but pointed to no previous opinion by the Court or any of its members 
reading Vasquez’s boilerplate in the startling way that he insisted it be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Justice Scalia has been rather more methodologically consistent.  His quest for textual fidel-
ity and original understanding of the Sixth Amendment in Crawford anticipated his similar ap-
proach to the Second Amendment in Heller.  See supra p. 152.  But as we shall see later, he too 
has failed to articulate and follow a convincing and coherent approach when the Court’s cases 
and the Constitution’s original meaning collide.  See infra pp. 160–61. 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 46 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
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read.47  A computer search confirms that no such opinion exists.  Thus, 
Justice Stevens’s claims in Heller about precedent were themselves 
unprecedented.48 
If Vasquez meant what Justice Stevens said it meant, then Vasquez 
itself would contradict landmark opinions in which the Court over-
ruled itself simply because an earlier case got the Constitution wrong, 
even though the precedent-setting Court considered (and erroneously 
rejected) the arguments and evidence that later persuaded the overrul-
ing Court.49  Beyond the practice of the Court as a whole, many of our 
nation’s greatest Justices have refused to acquiesce in cases they 
deemed egregiously wrong, and have never felt obliged to add some 
new argument or fact in each subsequent case.  Justices Brennan and 
Marshall’s stance in literally hundreds of post-1976 death penalty cases 
furnishes perhaps the most obvious example.  Justice Stevens himself 
furnishes another.  He has repeatedly rejected the Court’s state sover-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2824 n.4 (“[T]he careful observer will discern that any detours from 
the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable reasons, and only when 
the Court has felt obliged to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts 
newly ascertained.” (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
bland Vasquez dictum did not purport to lay down a rigid legal prerequisite for all future overrul-
ings.  Indeed, in its very next sentence (a sentence not quoted by Justice Stevens), the Vasquez 
Court declared that “[o]ur history does not impose any rigid formula to constrain the Court in the 
disposition of cases.”  Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266.  As the coda for this meditation on stare decisis, 
Vasquez closed with a sweepingly open-ended list of reasons for overruling: stare decisis might 
properly yield if the Court deemed a particular precedent “outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or 
otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious reconsideration.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Moreover, 
surely Vasquez’s reference to “experience” properly includes the experiences encoded in the Consti-
tution itself — that is, the experiences of the American people that led them to put a given rule 
into the Constitution in the first place.  And nothing in the words “facts newly ascertained” says 
that these facts must have been unavailable to the precedent-setting Court.  “Newly ascertained” 
does not self-evidently mean “newly available” or “never before considered by the Court.”  Rather, 
it quite naturally can mean a fact that was never before accepted or properly understood by the 
Court — or a fact that was previously accepted and is now confirmed afresh (“newly”). 
 48 The most notable citation to Vasquez by a Court majority on the subject of stare decisis in 
constitutional cases simply invoked the case for the following proposition: precedent should be 
followed “absent demonstration that our earlier cases were themselves a misinterpretation of some 
constitutional command.”  Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 366–367 (1993) (citing Vasquez, 474 
U.S. at 265–66).  In another majority opinion — in a case where the Court ultimately opted to 
overrule a prior precedent — the citation to Vasquez on the value of stare decisis was followed by 
this reminder: “[n]evertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 
‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).  
  Prior to Vasquez, here is what the Court said in Allwright: “[W]hen convinced of former er-
ror, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.  In constitutional questions, where 
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its 
history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions.”  All-
wright, 321 U.S. at 665.  
 49 See,  e.g.,  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968) (overruling Hodges v. 
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906)). 
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eign immunity rulings and called for their overturning — not because 
he has any new fact or argument but simply because he believes the 
earlier Court got the Constitution wrong.50  To be clear: I applaud Jus-
tice Stevens for his methodological stand in these sovereign immunity 
cases.  I just wish he had stayed true to this methodology in Heller.  
Once again: Justice Stevens, please meet Justice Stevens.51 
And also, please remember Justice Marshall.  Thurgood Marshall, 
the author of Vasquez, devoted his life as a litigator to the dismantling 
of Jim Crow and the overturning of gross judicial errors such as Plessy 
v. Ferguson.52  One would hope that he did not believe that Plessy 
could be overturned only if some new fact or argument could be ad-
duced against it.  And, even if he ever did believe this, we should not.  
Surely Plessy was ripe for overruling the day it was decided even if 
every single thing that could be said about its wrongness was in fact 
said in dissent earlier that day, and all these things were thus actually 
considered and erroneously rejected by the misguided Plessy majority. 
3.  Reliance. — However, to overrule a case not the day it was de-
cided but decades later is to introduce additional jurisprudential wrin-
kles.  And here we come to another facet of precedent, namely, its con-
nection to reliance interests. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97–98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept [Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)] as controlling precedent.  First and foremost, the reasoning of that opinion 
is so profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers’ conception of the 
constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to the usual deference or respect owed to deci-
sions of this Court.  Stare decisis, furthermore, has less force in the area of constitutional law.”). 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined this dissent. 
 51 A focus on individual Justices prompts interesting questions about whether a Justice’s age 
might predictably influence his or her attraction or resistance to precedent-entrenching proposals 
such as the one Justice Stevens floated in Heller.  Given that such efforts restrict the immediate 
freedom of future Court majorities, we might expect younger Justices — who are on average more 
likely to serve longer and thus to be in more future majorities — to be more skeptical of precedent 
entrenchment than older Justices, who will be tying their successors’ hands more than their own 
with any new precedent-entrenchment rule.  True, an entrenching formula can also be seen as 
empowering tomorrow’s Court to project its authority further into the future, but the formula 
requires immediate judicial forbearance without any ironclad guarantee that Justices in the far 
future will in fact reciprocate and enforce the deal.  Any newly adopted entrenchment rule also 
gives a windfall to past decisions and thus differentially advantages senior Justices who have on 
average joined more past majority opinions than junior Justices. 
 In Heller, it is perhaps suggestive that the three youngest Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas and Alito) all opposed the precedent-entrenching formula offered by Justice Ste-
vens; the two oldest Justices (Justices Stevens and Ginsburg) favored the formula; while the re-
maining four Justices in the middle of the Court’s age distribution (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, and Breyer) split evenly.  If we rank instead by actual seniority, the two most junior Jus-
tices (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito) opposed the entrenching formula offered by the 
most senior Justice (Justice Stevens) with the remaining six Justices in the middle of the seniority 
distribution (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) splitting evenly. 
 52 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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The text, history, and structure of the Constitution cohere to sug-
gest that courts may properly take account of reasonable reliance in-
terests.  Both the Constitution’s general structure and the specific Arti-
cle III language vesting federal courts with “judicial Power” over 
federal question “Cases” in “Law and Equity”53 envision a system in 
which Article III tribunals will sit in judgment over events that have 
already occurred and will decide these cases, not by creating new rules, 
but by declaring the pre-existing federal law that applied when the 
relevant litigation-creating events happened.  A variety of general 
background rules of law and equity in place at the Founding and con-
tinuing to the present day allow courts to keep reliance considerations 
in mind when judging past events, declaring rights, and fashioning 
remedies. 
A Supreme Court precedent handed down at time T1 might well 
create reliance interests, even though this precedent is later deemed 
constitutionally erroneous by the Court at time T2.  At time T2, the 
overruling Court may properly consider the remedial implications of 
these reliance factors.  But a proper consideration, consistent with the 
Constitution’s general structure of coordinate branches, should not 
treat the Supreme Court’s past constitutional errors as categorically 
different from the past constitutional errors of other branches.  Thus, a 
congressional statute enacted at time T1 — or a presidential order, or a 
lower federal court ruling, or a state governmental action for that mat-
ter — might well also create legitimate reliance interests, even though 
this statute (or order, or ruling, or other action) is later deemed consti-
tutionally erroneous by the Court at time T2. 
Consider for example a kidnapping prosecution at time T1, in 
which the prosecutor, relying on Supreme Court precedent X, intro-
duces a certain kind of hearsay evidence and wins a conviction that is 
affirmed on appeal.  Years later, the Court decides that precedent X 
got the Constitution — in particular, the Confrontation Clause — 
wrong.  But to overturn the verdict at this late date might well be re-
medially problematic.  Reversal might penalize the prosecutor’s reli-
ance and make the prosecution irreparably worse off (and the defen-
dant hugely better off) than if precedent X had simply never existed.  
Suppose, for instance, that without precedent X on the books at time 
T1, the prosecutor would simply have introduced a very different piece 
of evidence via an alternative witness to prove the same point; but 
years later this piece of evidence is no longer available to her because 
the alternative witness has moved away. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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In such a situation, what should the Court do at time T2?  To reaf-
firm precedent X even after a Court is persuaded that X got the Con-
stitution wrong would be to do violence to the ultimate supremacy of 
the Constitution.  So as a first step, the Court should declare the law 
properly: “X was erroneous and is hereby overruled.”  (And, contra the 
Heller Stevens, the Court should do so even if the Justices in X fully 
considered but erroneously rejected all the correct constitutional facts 
and arguments.)  But it does not automatically follow that the kidnap-
per should go free, pending retrial, for this would be an unfortunate 
remedial windfall.   
In this and similar settings, how certain must the Court be that the 
other evidence would have done the trick?  How decisive should it be 
that this evidence was not, in fact, introduced at trial even though it 
could have been?  Should the Court have different rules for direct ap-
peals as opposed to habeas cases?  For cases arising in state as opposed 
to federal courts?  If state courts are not required to free the kidnap-
per, should they be allowed to do so under state remedial laws? 
These remedial questions involve various equitable considerations 
as to which the Constitution’s text, history, and structure may give 
relatively little specific guidance, even if these sources are quite clear 
on the underlying point that precedent X was wrong on the meaning 
of the Confrontation Clause.  In recent years, the Court has addressed 
these and related issues under an assortment of remedial doctrines 
such as “harmless error” and “retroactivity.”  Perhaps no opinion of the 
Court has treated these jurisprudential issues with more nuance than 
Justice Stevens’s Danforth opinion, explicitly building on Justice 
Scalia’s earlier contributions.54 
Yet for all his sophistication in Danforth, Justice Stevens’s analysis 
of jurisprudentially related questions in Heller disappoints.  Seeking 
another way, beyond Vasquez, to boost Miller’s firepower, Justice Ste-
vens repeatedly relied on reliance.  He spoke of the “substantial reli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Here, once again, is Danforth: 
[W]e note at the outset that the very word “retroactivity” is misleading because it speaks 
in temporal terms.  “Retroactivity” suggests that when we declare that a new constitu-
tional rule of criminal procedure is “nonretroactive,” we are implying that the right at is-
sue was not in existence prior to the date the “new rule” was announced.  But this is in-
correct.  As we have already explained, the source of a “new rule” is the Constitution 
itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the underlying 
right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new rule.  What we are actually de-
termining when we assess the “retroactivity” of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a 
newly announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the 
announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.   
Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008). 
  The opinion continued in a footnote: “It may, therefore, make more sense to speak in terms 
of the ‘redressability’ of violations of new rules, rather than the ‘retroactivity’ of such rules.  Cf. 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).”  
Id. at 1035 n.5. 
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ance” of “judges and legislators” and “citizens” — indeed, of “hundreds 
of judges” and “millions of Americans” — on Miller and its pro–gun 
control lower court progeny.55  But how, precisely, did any of these 
persons or institutions rely to their detriment on Miller in a way that 
should entrench Miller from an immediate and fully operative overrul-
ing if Miller did indeed get the Constitution wrong? 
Had the Supreme Court in 1939 struck down a gun control ordi-
nance banning handguns — call it Ordinance X — it is easy to see 
how reliance interests would have arisen in a way that would bear on 
how the 1939 case should be overruled, if later deemed erroneous.  
Imagine a law-abiding citizen, Nick Deller, who kept a handgun at 
home in 2007, notwithstanding the existence on the books of gun con-
trol Ordinance Y, because Deller reasonably believed that Y was in 
every relevant respect identical to X and thus clearly invalid under the 
logic of our hypothetical 1939 case.  Were the Court in 2008 to deem 
the 1939 case erroneous and squarely overrule it, Deller’s prior hand-
gun possession should never subject him to prosecution or penalty.  
Deller relied on the 1939 case in a rather obvious way: had the 1939 
Court precedent never existed, Deller would not have kept the gun be-
cause he would have understood that Ordinance Y fully applied.  To 
punish or penalize Deller for his pre-2008 gun possession — to make 
him worse off than he would have been had the 1939 case never ex-
isted — would be inequitable and perhaps also a violation of his due 
process right to fair notice.  In this hypothetical, even though the 1939 
case should be overruled because the Court now views it as erroneous, 
the Court must attend to the reliance interests that it created and 
should try to minimize the degree to which persons are made worse off 
than they would have been had the case never existed. 
But in real life the 1939 Court case upheld a gun control ordinance, 
and it is hard to see how overruling it if it is now seen as erroneous 
works any inequity or due process violation.  Precisely how did 
“judges” rely on Miller in a way that would make them worse off if 
Miller were immediately overruled?  No one is proposing to impeach 
lower court judges because they followed Miller’s erroneous lead.56  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823, 2845 & n.38, 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens’s re-
peated emphasis on reliance by “judges” was no casual slip.  Rather, this emphasis intertwined 
with his efforts to stress the pro–gun control consensus among circuit courts between 1939 and 
2000.  See supra p. 149. 
 56 True, a lower court judge might suffer a reputational hit and a psychic letdown: she fol-
lowed Miller faithfully and now the Supreme Court is in effect reversing her, making her worse 
off than if the case had never existed!  But surely this is not the sort of reliance generally pro-
tected by remedial principles and constitutional structure.  In fact, the Court itself has made clear 
that there is no judicial dishonor when a lower court follows erroneous Supreme Court precedent 
and leaves the task of correcting the Court’s own error to the Court itself.  See, e.g.,  Rodriguez de 
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Precisely how would “legislators” or “citizens” be worse off by over-
ruling Miller than they would have been had Miller never existed?  
Justice Stevens offered no satisfying answers or analysis:57 “reliance”  
in his hands became a vague catchall for entrenching erroneous  
precedents.58 
In Justice Stevens’s opinion, then, we see a remarkable failure to 
offer a coherent analysis of one of the most obvious, important, and 
recurring questions of constitutional law: what to do when case law 
contradicts the Constitution. 
The methodological failure is not confined to Justice Stevens, nor 
even to the Justices who joined his dissent.  Consider, for example, 
Justice Stevens’s dueling partner in Heller, Justice Scalia.  In particu-
lar, consider Justice Scalia’s attitude toward the exclusionary rule.  
Justice Scalia knows full well that this rule strays quite far — miles, 
really — from the text and original understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment.  (And nothing in the text or original meaning of any 
other amendment supports the rule.)  Yet Justice Scalia has never 
called for the complete and immediate abolition of the exclusionary 
rule.  Why not?  What legitimate reliance interests stand in the way?  
The interest of an especially calculating criminal in getting out of jail 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  In one recent episode, the Court 
praised circuit judges even as it reversed them because they had properly followed an old Court 
precedent that the current Court ultimately decided to explicitly repudiate.  See Eberhart v. 
United States, 126 S. Ct. 403, 407 (2005) (per curiam). 
 57 Perhaps the underlying thought was that, absent Miller’s and lower courts’ broad approval 
of gun control in the mid-twentieth century, gun control supporters would have amended the Sec-
ond Amendment out of the Constitution.  But of course they are free to do so today, and are thus 
no worse off than they would have been had Miller never existed.  If the concern is somehow 
about the increased risk of crime in the District pending the likely ratification of a repealing 
amendment, this concern would at most argue for a modest time lag before any overruling took 
full remedial effect.  One can imagine other possible reliance interests, but, to repeat, Justice Ste-
vens offered no details or analysis, and most imaginable reliance interests would merely counsel a 
short delay before a full overruling should take effect. 
 58 At one particularly unfortunate turn, Justices Stevens and Scalia talked past each other.  
Justice Scalia pointed to the American people’s legitimate reliance on the “true meaning” of the 
Second Amendment, which he believed his opinion expounded and restored.  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 
2815 n.24 (emphasis added).  This is a very different sort of reliance interest than the one that we 
have been considering so far, namely, reliance on a constitutionally erroneous Court case (or other 
government action) that has given rise to conduct relying on the validity of the case (or action). 
  Justice Stevens responded by saying that it was “hard to see how Americans have ‘relied,’ in 
the usual sense of the word, on the existence of a constitutional right that, until 2001, had been 
rejected by every federal court to take up the question.”  Id. at 2844 n.38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
  But as noted, “reliance” here was being used by Justice Scalia in a different sense.  If the 
Framers and Amenders did indeed constitutionally codify a given right, subsequent generations of 
Americans are entitled to believe that it will always be protected.  Otherwise, what is the point of 
writing down the Constitution and proclaiming it supreme law?  And why bother to keep it short?  
Precisely so that the people themselves can directly engage it and be part of its unfolding interpre-
tation.  The people are entitled to rely on the written Constitution’s core original meaning and to 
rely on current judges to restore this meaning if past judges have erroneously constricted it. 
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free if the cops ever err in procuring compelling evidence against him?  
Merely to state this interest is to see its absurdity: this is not the stuff 
of proper reliance worthy of equitable protection.59  So for Justice 
Scalia what presumably protects the exclusionary rule is not its con-
formance to constitutional text and history, nor its protection of legiti-
mate reliance interests, but rather the simple fact that it is a well-
settled practice.  But how can this justify continuation of a rule that 
strays so far from the Constitution itself?  Here, it is Justice Scalia who 
has no good answer to the obvious question. 
Sad to say, none of the current Justices has a wholly satisfying vi-
sion of how to proceed when the Constitution itself is sharply at odds 
with the case law.60  While Justice Stevens said the oddest things about 
this issue in Heller itself, the general failure to offer a good conceptual 
account of precedent is probably a bigger lapse in the overall jurispru-
dence of those on the Court, like Justice Scalia, who reckon themselves 
originalists and who usually insist that it is the Constitution, and not 
the case law, that stands as the supreme law of our land. 
While we are apportioning blame, let us reserve some for HLR.  
Sensible constitutional analysis involves careful consideration of both 
the document and the doctrine — of the Constitution itself as well as 
the case law construing it.  Yet HLR has historically devoted vastly 
more institutional attention to the latter than to the former.  Every 
HLR Volume begins with a November Supreme Court issue gazing in-
tently at recent case law, but HLR has no regular counterbalancing is-
sue devoted to the Constitution itself.  Small wonder, then, that many 
former editors and loyal readers of HLR might tend to overweight 
precedent.61 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 Even if this interest were to be protected, it would offer no shield to any crime committed 
after the Court made clear that the exclusionary rule must go.  For detailed analysis of the various 
legal interests at stake, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 27, 97–116, 151–52 (1997).   
 60 Although I cannot fully defend this admittedly sweeping charge today, I have begun to do 
so elsewhere.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, On Text and Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
961 (2008); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the 
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 78–89 (2000). 
 61 Justice Stevens’s Heller dissent is emblematic, privileging precedent by both overreading it 
and overentrenching it.  First he tried to make a mountain out of the Miller molehill, insisting 
that the case decided far more than it did.  See supra p. 151.  Then he defended his extreme 
precedent-entrenching formula, which would require that an overruling be accompanied by “new 
evidence,” by appealing to precedent itself — Vasquez — in a methodologically circular enterprise 
remarkable for the total absence of any plausible accompanying textual, structural, or originalist 
arguments for this extreme entrenchment.  See supra pp. 154–55.  Is it wholly coincidental that 
Justice Stevens’s dissent was joined by two HLR alumni, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and yet 
another HLR well-wisher, Justice David Souter?  (Since the beginning of the 2000 Term, Justice 
Souter has hired more HLR alumni as law clerks than any other Justice.  To preserve consistency, 
this calculation combines the clerk counts for Chief Justice Rehnquist and his successor, Chief 
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4.  Popular Ratification. — Before we leave the fascinating meth-
odological issues raised by Heller, one additional item deserves to be 
brought into view: the Ninth Amendment. 
Thanks to this amendment, it is possible to imagine a scenario in 
which a Court case that got the Constitution wrong at time T1 should 
be affirmed rather than repudiated at time T2.  The Ninth Amend-
ment reminds us that the textual enumeration of certain constitutional 
rights should “not be construed to deny or disparage” other rights “re-
tained by the people.”  But where should judges — or the rest of us, 
for that matter — look for nontextual constitutional rights?  Under one 
attractive reading of the Ninth Amendment, unenumerated constitu-
tional rights retained by the people encompass, among other things, 
those basic rights that the people at large in fact believe that they have 
and should have under the Constitution.  If enough people believe in a 
given right and view it as fundamental, then that right is for these 
very reasons a right of the people.62 
It may not matter how the people’s belief arose — even if it arose 
as a result of a Supreme Court case that was wrong as a matter of text 
and original intent when decided.  Thus, if the Court at time T1 gets 
the Constitution’s text and original understanding wrong and pro-
claims a right that does not in fact properly exist at time T1, and if the 
vast majority of Americans come to rejoice in this right,63 the Court at 
time T2 should affirm the originally erroneous precedent.  The case, 
though wrong when decided, has become right thanks to an interven-
ing change of fact — broad and deep popular endorsement — that the 
Constitution’s own text, via the Ninth Amendment, endows with spe-
cial significance. 
Note the key asymmetry here: a case that construes a textual  
constitutional right too narrowly is different from one that construes  
the right too broadly.  Even if both cases come to be widely embraced  
by the citizenry, only the rights-expanding case interacts with the text  
of the Ninth Amendment so as to immunize it from subsequent  
reversal.64 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Justice Roberts, and also combines the counts for Justice O’Connor and her replacement, Justice 
Alito.) 
 62 A similar analysis can be applied to the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The rights protected by this clause explicitly apply against 
states and implicitly against the federal government as well.  See AMAR, supra note 11, at 163–80, 
195–96 n.*, 281 n.*.  
 63 This is not something that can be said about the exclusionary rule, whose upside-down logic 
springing the guilty and demoralizing crime victims has always been strongly resisted by a very 
large portion of the general citizenry, especially in cases of violent crime such as murder, rape, and 
robbery. 
 64 An exception to this general approach might well be warranted if expanding a nontextual 
right would somehow contract a textual right. 
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Such rights-expanding cases that Americans have come to embrace, 
whether or not these cases originally got the Constitution’s text and 
original understanding correct, deserve a name.  Let us call them 
Ninth Amendment superprecedents.  And let us honor these cases and 
the new rights they proclaim, rather than denying or disparaging these 
rights of the people, by the people, for the people, and from the people. 
As it turns out, the Ninth Amendment also casts light on other  
aspects of the Heller debate.  But before we examine that amend- 
ment (and its counterpart language in Fourteenth Amendment) in 
more detail, let us take a closer look at the provision that all the Jus-
tices in Heller thought was at the center of the dispute: the Second  
Amendment.  
B.  Constitutional Substance in Heller:  
The Case of the Missing Amendments 
“A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a  
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed.”65 
Them’s fightin’ words in Heller.  Justice Scalia insisted that these 
words, like their older cousins in English common law and their com-
panions in early state constitutions, clearly encompass an individual’s 
right to have a ready gun at home for self-protection.  Justice Stevens 
said no: he read these words as miles removed from the common law 
right of self-defense.  As we have seen, Justice Stevens wasted consid-
erable energy trying to deploy Miller and other precedents, including 
Vasquez and pre-2001 lower court rulings, none of which had enough 
firepower and accuracy to do much damage to Scalia’s claims.  But 
when Justice Stevens moved beyond precedent and took direct aim at 
Justice Scalia on the grounds of text, history, and structure, the res-
ulting shootout was a closely balanced duel, with each side giving 
nearly as good as it got.  Were the Second Amendment the only consti-
tutional text on point, the closeness of the vote in Heller would have 
been warranted. 
1.  Holism Within the Second Amendment: Two Clauses, One Vi-
sion. — Consider first the relationship between the Second Amend-
ment’s opening words and its closing command.  Law typically tells us 
what to do, but the Second Amendment, in its preamble, also tells us 
why: the right to keep and bear arms exists principally to protect the 
Constitution’s militia structure. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 U.S. CONST. amend. II (punctuation modernized).  On the oddities of comma placements in 
various eighteenth-century sources, see Ian Ayres, Pregnant with Embarrassments: An Incomplete 
Theory of the Seventh Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 385, 386–89 (1991). 
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Justice Stevens saw a tight link between the why and the what, be-
tween the Amendment’s preamble and its operative command.  On his 
view, because the right was designed to safeguard America’s militia 
structure, its core command protects militiamen in their military use of 
arms.66  Dick Heller should have lost because he was not an active-
service militiaman and because there was nothing military about his 
having his own private firearm in his own private home for self-
defense against burglars. 
Justice Scalia countered that while there should indeed be some 
link between preamble and command, the link need not be tight.  On 
his view, an individual’s right to keep a private gun for self-protection 
even in a wholly nonmilitary space such as a home “helped to secure 
the ideal of a citizen militia”67 at the Founding by insuring that citi-
zens would have guns that they knew how to use, guns that could 
never be confiscated on a pretext — and thus guns that could be of 
service to the militia if tyrants ever tried to usurp power.  In this way 
the hip bone connected to the shoulder bone. 
Though Justice Scalia did not stress the point, Founding-era mili-
tias did guard against private thugs, such as pirates and renegade In-
dians, as well as against more organized threats.  Before the emergence 
of professional police in the nineteenth century, the militia served vari-
ous law enforcement functions, alongside the posse comitatus, the hue 
and cry, and the self-informing grand jury.  In the Founders’ world, 
individual self-protection and community defense were not wholly 
separate spheres.   
Justice Scalia also linked Dick Heller’s claim of right to the pream-
ble’s militia by stressing that Heller’s pistol was the sort of firearm 
customarily used by military officers in armies and militias.68  At first, 
this suggested linkage startles: is the relevant right the right of the gun 
or of the man?69  Surely the latter, argued Justice Stevens: the Bill of 
Rights is about persons; and Dick Heller, the person, was not an ac-
tive-service militiaman.  This focus on persons seemed all the more 
natural to Justice Stevens in light of the Court’s unanimous 1990 opin-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 66 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 2801 (majority opinion). 
 68 Id. at 2815–17. 
 69 Here is a parable recounted by one prominent Founder:  
Today a man owns a jackass worth fifty dollars and he is entitled to vote; but before the 
next election the jackass dies.  The man in the mean time has become more experienced, 
his knowledge of the principles of government, and his acquaintance with mankind, are 
more extensive, and he is therefore better qualified to make a proper selection of rulers 
— but the jackass is dead and the man cannot vote.  Now gentlemen, pray inform me, 
in whom is the right of suffrage?  In the man or in the jackass?”  
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE CASKET, OR FLOWERS OF LITERATURE, WIT AND SENTI-
MENT (1828), quoted in ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 3 (2000). 
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ion in Perpich v. Department of Defense,70 an opinion that Stevens 
himself authored and that concerned the rights and duties of active-
service militiamen under Article I, Section 8.  Predisposed to view mi-
litia-related issues through the prism of Perpich (a case cited repeat-
edly by Justice Stevens in Heller but never by Justice Scalia), Justice 
Stevens saw the Section 8 clauses concerning the “militia” as tightly 
linked — intratextually, logically, and historically — to the Second 
Amendment’s preambulatory “militia” clause, which in turn tightly in-
termeshed with the Amendment’s operative command language.71 
Here it was Justice Scalia’s turn to wield precedent — indeed, Jus-
tice Stevens’s own weapon of choice, United States v. Miller.  Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, Miller did not need to be overruled because its 
narrow holding did not conflict with the Second Amendment right as 
correctly understood from a textualist and originalist perspective.  The 
Second Amendment claim lost in Miller, Justice Scalia argued, not (as 
Justice Stevens would have it) because Mr. Miller was not a militia-
man and therefore fell outside the Second Amendment, but rather be-
cause the gun in Miller was not a military-style weapon.  Here, Justice 
Scalia suggested, was a related link between the operative clause and 
the preamble: the only arms protected are those that are generally 
suitable for militia use.72 
This focus on things, rather than persons — shades of Pennoyer v. 
Neff!73 — runs counter to much modern thinking about rights.  Never-
theless, in one corner of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice 
Scalia has similarly tried to direct our gaze away from persons and 
toward things.  To determine whether a civil forfeiture is so extreme as 
to violate the Constitution, Justice Scalia has urged that the Court 
should not look at how much the government has in fact taken away 
from a person, but rather at how closely the forfeited thing — the deo-
dand, the contraband, the “offending” physical instrument — was con-
nected to the prohibited transaction.74 
Even if Justice Scalia’s focus on objects is the best way to concep-
tualize constitutional commands concerning civil forfeitures, it remains 
a rather im-personal way to read the Second Amendment, whose text 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 496 U.S. 334 (1990). 
 71 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2842–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 72 Id. at 2815–16 (majority opinion). 
 73 95 U.S. 714 (1878).  Pennoyer, the famous case explaining hoary rules of in rem jurisdiction, 
was good law when Miller was decided but was ultimately overruled in the 1945 case of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 74 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
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does not say that “the right of arms to be borne shall not be infringed.”   
Rather, the Amendment declares a right of “the people.” 
Which brings us to the nub: who were “the people” within the 
meaning of the Second Amendment at the time of the Founding?  
Consider three possible readings. 
Reading One — The “Select Militia” Reading: “A well regulated 
militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of or-
ganized militiamen (that is, those in active service who regularly mus-
ter and train with other militiamen) to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed.” 
Reading Two — The “General Militia” Reading: “A well regulated 
militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the 
general militia (that is, all those in active service plus all those capable 
of being called upon to serve) to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed.” 
Reading Three — The “Fourth Amendment” Reading: “A well 
regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the 
right of all adult citizens (roughly speaking, the same rights-holders as 
are protected by the Fourth Amendment) to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed.” 
Justice Stevens in effect chose Reading One; Justice Scalia, Read-
ing Three.  The best answer lies between these two extremes: Reading 
Two. 
The key to the textual puzzle is this: the otherwise stilted syntax of 
the Amendment, with its reference to the “militia” in the opening and 
the “people” in the closing, makes the most sense and becomes the least 
stilted when we read these two key nouns, “militia” and “people,” as 
synonyms.  Here is the key linkage between the Amendment’s two 
parts.  In eighteenth-century republican ideology, the (general) militia 
were the people.  Indeed, an earlier version of the Amendment made 
this implicit syntactical equation textually explicit by referring to “a 
well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people.”75  Al-
though this extra verbiage clarified the Amendment’s substance, it 
clunked up the style of an already grammatically complicated sentence 
and eventually got dropped.  Even so, the equation of the militia with 
the people is implicit in the very syntax and flow of the final Amend-
ment as a whole when read against its background of eighteenth-
century republican ideology. 
We can now see why Justice Stevens’s reading was too narrow.  
Justice Stevens read “militia” in a way that is commonplace in twenty-
first-century America.  Today, the word typically refers to the paid 
semiprofessional volunteers who make up the modern National Guard 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 75 1 SEN. J. 63 (Aug. 25, 1789). 
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— semiprofessionals who were at the heart of the Perpich case.  But in 
the eighteenth century, such a small, self-selected, semiprofessional, 
and not entirely representative cadre would have been typically de-
scribed as a “select militia” and viewed by republicans as merely a jun-
ior varsity version of the professional standing army that they dis-
dained.  For these Founding-era republicans, a select militia would not 
offer a free state the security that could only be provided by a truly 
general militia comprising a wide cross-section of the polity.  Roughly 
speaking, the Founders’ general militia encompassed the same men 
who voted and who served on juries — that is, the people. 
Justice Stevens thus misread the word “militia.”  In 1789, when this 
word was used without the qualifying adjective “select,” it ordinarily 
referred to the general militia — all men capable of serving, not just 
those in active service.76  Justice Stevens’s reading of “militia” ends up 
contradicting the preamble’s core ideological claim; a select militia like 
today’s National Guard would not have been viewed by the republican 
framers of the Second Amendment as truly the best security of a free 
polity.  And — the key point from synonymity — a select militia was 
never viewed as the people themselves.  If “people” and “militia” are 
synonyms, “militia” must mean “general militia.” 
We can now also see why Justice Scalia’s reading was too expan-
sive.  If “people” really means virtually all adult Americans, the opera-
tive clause loses its linkage to the preamble and becomes hugely over-
broad.  Fully half of Fourth Amendment rights-holders are females 
today and were females in 1789.  But in 1789, women were not typi-
cally viewed as part of the general militia.  Nor, as a rule, were women 
voters or jurors.  But if Justice Scalia is right, then the Framers’ Sec-
ond Amendment was in effect designed to read as follows: “A well 
regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the 
right of persons — most of whom are not in the militia, have never 
been in the militia, and can never be in the militia — to keep and bear 
arms shall not be infringed.”  Such a reading begins to border on non 
sequitur.77  If “militia” and “people” are synonyms, the “people” here 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2800 (noting that “the ordinary definition of the militia” encom-
passed “all able-bodied men”); see also id. at 2799 (“[T]he Militia comprised all males physically 
capable of acting in concert for the common defense.” (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174, 179 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 77 The “woman” question thus poses a dilemma for Justice Scalia.  If he insists that women 
were centrally covered by the Second Amendment, the linkage between the preamble and the op-
erative clause becomes more obviously attenuated.  But if women are not covered, then how can 
we read the amendment as safeguarding a right of individual self-defense — a right surely every 
bit as vital to females as to males?  Blackstone, for example, viewed the right to self-preservation 
as an inalienable civil right of all persons, as distinct from political rights, such as voting and of-
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sensibly means something narrower than in the Fourth Amendment, 
which was, as we shall see, designed to encompass women. 
2.  Holism Across Amendments: Intratextualism. — At this point, 
we must move beyond the Second Amendment’s two clauses to a 
broader form of “intratextual” analysis, examining how words and 
phrases recur in different parts of the Constitution.  As previously 
noted, Justice Stevens saw the Second Amendment as connected to the 
Constitution’s allocation of military power in Article I, Section 8, in 
part because the word “militia” prominently appears in both places.78  
Justice Scalia, by contrast, saw a particularly promising intratextual 
lead in the Fourth Amendment, which, like the Second, refers to “the 
right of the people.”  He suggested that since both Amendments use 
this same elaborate phrase, the phrase should mean the same thing, or 
something very similar, in both places.79  Fourth Amendment rights-
holders need not have any tight link to the militia, so neither should 
Second Amendment rights-holders. 
Intratextual analysis is a centuries-old and often elegant form of 
holistic legal reasoning, but one that must be used with caution and 
close attention to context.80  Constitutional words do not always mean 
the same thing when they recur.  Some words are instead best read as 
clever chameleons that take their precise meaning and coloration from 
their immediate surrounding.81  Consider the chameleon word “per-
son.”  Sometimes the word is best read to include corporations, which 
deserve Fifth Amendment due process rights along with human be-
ings.  But other times the word is best read to exclude corporations, 
entities that have no souls to torment and thus are not protected by the 
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, which was designed in 
part to prevent spiritual torment.  Corporations are not persons for the 
Article I Census Clause, but are persons with rights against economic 
discrimination under general equal protection principles.82 
The word “people” is likewise a chameleon word, as is obvious 
when we ask the “woman” question: Does the constitutional phrase 
“the people” include women?  None of the Heller Justices squarely 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
fice-holding, enjoyed by a select subset.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*141–44; see also AMAR, supra note 11, at 48–49, 261–62. 
 78 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799–2800 (“[W]e agree . . . that ‘militia’ means the same thing in 
Article I and the Second Amendment.”). 
 79 See id. at 2790–91. 
 80 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
 81 See id. at 775, 785, 793 & n.182, 801 n.203 (introducing and analyzing the concept of “cha-
meleon” words). 
 82 Judicial doctrine treats corporations as persons for purposes of economic equal protection in 
cases such as Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), but not as persons 
for purposes of voting-rights equal protection in cases such as Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964).  Thus, corporations are treated as alternately persons and nonpersons under the very same 
constitutional clause! 
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posed this question.  It turns out that the answer is also both yes and 
no. 
Take a quick look at the Constitution’s other famous Preamble: 
“We the People . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution . . . .”  
This Preamble described an extraordinary act of voting — an un-
precedented and continent-wide process of ratifying the Framers’ pro-
posed Constitution.  Women as a rule were not included in the actual 
ordainment votes.  Nor were Founding-era women generally included 
in voting for state legislators or Congress.  Almost immediately after 
the Preamble, the Constitution’s Article I, Section 2 referred to “the 
people” as synomymous with these voters.  Here, too, women were in 
effect excluded.  Yet women were meant to enjoy Fourth Amendment 
rights and thus were included in “the people” for this part of the Con-
stitution.  What gives? 
History and standard textualism are especially helpful interpretive 
tools here.  Protecting women in their homes from intrusive searchers 
and snoopers was openly articulated as one of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s goals.83  Likewise, the Third Amendment was motivated in 
part by a desire to protect women in their private homes from rough 
treatment, or worse, at the mercy of armed soldiers that an oppressive 
government might seek to quarter in private dwellings.84  But Justice 
Scalia pointed to no similar evidence that any prominent participant in 
the process of drafting and ratifying the Second Amendment ever 
claimed it would encompass a woman’s right to self-defense. 
Textually, the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the people” in-
termeshed with two explicit references to “persons” — and women are 
surely persons.85  Textually, Article I’s reference to “the people” inter-
meshed with two explicit references to “Electors” (that is, voters) — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 83 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 776, 
808–09 (1994) (quoting and analyzing a 1787 pamphlet calling for constitutional protection in a 
scenario in which a constable searching “for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in 
which there was a woman and searched under her shift”).  In keeping with this history, Justice 
Scalia has used the Fourth Amendment to invalidate a high-tech search technique that would en-
able the government to determine “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily 
sauna and bath — a detail that many would consider ‘intimate.’” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 38 (2001).   
 84 See, e.g., Robert A. Gross, Public and Private in the Third Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 
215, 219 (1991) (quoting colonist expressing hostility to Parliament’s Quartering Act placing sol-
diers “abed” with America’s “Wives and Daughters”). 
 85 So too are aliens.  Longstanding commentary dating at least as far back as Jefferson’s criti-
cism of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 has recognized the Fourth Amendment rights of even 
nonresident aliens to security in their persons and freedom from arbitrary arrest.  Yet it would  
be outlandish to insist that such nonresident aliens had a Second Amendment entitlement to be 
part of America’s general militia merely because these persons were protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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and in 1789, women were generally not Electors.  Finally, in the Sec-
ond Amendment, as we have seen, the reference to “the people” inter-
meshed with an explicit reference to the “Militia”— and women were 
not, in 1789, part of the general militia. 
If we truly seek to identify holistic constitutional patterns, the Sec-
ond Amendment is closer conceptually to the Preamble and to Article I 
than to the Fourth Amendment.  Eligible voters and eligible members 
of the general militia were roughly equivalent groups in late-
eighteenth-century America.86  The classical civic republican ideology 
at the heart of the Second Amendment envisioned a regime  
in which those who voted would in general serve as military defenders, 
and those who served as military defenders would in general vote (and 
also serve on juries).87  Justice Scalia noted that there is a more elabo-
rate textual overlap between the Second and the Fourth Amendment 
than between the Second Amendment and Article I.88  It is a fair 
point, but ultimately not a decisive one without stronger evidence of 
the conceptual linkages between the two amendments than Justice 
Scalia provided.89 
3.  Holism Across the Atlantic: Two Countries Divided by a Com-
mon Language? — Justice Scalia did adduce considerable evidence 
from pre-1789 English law recognizing an individual right to have a 
gun at home for self-defense.90  This English law vision did have deep 
conceptual connections to proto–Fourth Amendment ideas about the 
right to safeguard one’s home and one’s person from intrusion.  But 
English law never articulated the right to arms in the same language 
as did the Second Amendment.  The 1689 English Bill of Rights spoke 
of a right to arms in different accents than did the 1789 American Bill 
of Rights.91  England was neither a federal system nor a regime based 
on popular sovereignty.  The Founders’ America was both, and the 
themes of federalism and popular sovereignty ran close to the surface 
of the Second Amendment’s text.  (Local “militia” would counterbal-
ance a central army, and “the people” in this Amendment were the 
same “people” who had ordained the Constitution itself in an extraor-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 86 See AMAR, supra note 11, at 48–49 & n.*. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2790; see also supra p. 168. 
 89 For an alternative account of the textual overlap that reads the Fourth Amendment’s “right 
of the people” as a subtle gesture in the direction of civil juries of the people, who were expected 
to play a significant role in enforcing the Fourth Amendment, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMER-
ICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 326–27 (2005); see also AMAR, supra note 11, at 64–77.   
 90 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792 n.7. 
 91 See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of 
the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., c.2, § 7 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Bill of Rights] 
(“[T]he Subjects, which are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Condi-
tions, and as allowed by Law.”).  
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dinary act of popular sovereignty.)  England embraced a classically 
liberal right of subjects; America, a classically republican vision of  
citizens. 
Despite the many differences of geography, ideology, chronology, 
and legal wording separating English common law and the American 
Second Amendment, perhaps the American formulation of the arms-
bearing right was designed to be utterly identical to the English.  Or 
perhaps the Second Amendment aimed to add republican and federal-
ist elements to the liberal English right without subtracting one iota 
from the libertarian self-defense core of English law. 
But these are things to be proved, not assumed.  As Justice Stevens 
stressed, Justice Scalia cited no decisive historical evidence from the 
drafting or ratification of the Second Amendment that the Amendment 
aimed to protect the English common law right to have a weapon for 
personal self-defense.92  The limited evidence from 1787 to 1791 in fact 
tends to cut the other way.  For example, in 1788 some Massachusetts 
ratifying convention delegates did float a rather English-sounding ver-
sion of the right to arms.  Their version made no mention of the mili-
tia, omitted the militaristic phrase “bear arms,” and sweepingly af-
firmed a right of all “peaceable citizens” to “keep[] their own arms.”93  
But this libertarian articulation of the right was never endorsed by the 
Massachusetts convention, much less by the First Congress. 
Though Justice Scalia himself remarkably conceded that individual 
“self-defense had little to do with the [arms-bearing] right’s codifica-
tion” in the Second Amendment, he nevertheless confidently concluded 
that self-defense was “the central component of the right itself”94 be-
cause the Amendment was “widely understood to codify a pre-existing 
right, rather than to fashion a new one.”95  In essence, he relied on the 
Second Amendment’s text to bridge the wide gap in his historical evi-
dence: “The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes 
the pre-existence of the right . . . .”96  Hence the Amendment’s refer-
ence to “the [preexisting] right” rather than to “a [wholly novel] right.” 
Its use of “the,” however, does not necessarily mean that the Second 
Amendment reaffirmed the traditional English common law right 
rather than the more recent (but still pre-1789 and thus preexisting) 
right of the people to serve in militias in defense of their liberties, a 
right that had been made flesh by the American Revolution and that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 92 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 93 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1453 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000). 
 94 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801 (emphasis omitted). 
 95 Id. at 2804. 
 96 Id. at 2797. 
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inspired the elaborate militia rules codified in Article I, Section 8.  Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia’s reliance on the preexisting 
character of the Second Amendment right “is of course beside the 
point because the right to keep and bear arms for service in a state mi-
litia was also a pre-existing right.”97 
In response, Justice Scalia sniffed that the supposedly preexisting 
right that Justice Stevens identified did not in fact exist in English 
law.98  But so what?  Consider intratextually the First Amendment, 
which likewise singles out “the [preexisting] freedom of speech.”  Free-
dom of speech for ordinary Englishmen outside of Parliament was 
never an English law right; American freedom of speech was instead a 
republican and popular sovereignty right born in the American Revo-
lution itself.99  By 1789, citizen free speech was indeed a preexisting 
right, implicit in the very structure of the now-ratified Constitution 
and its popular sovereignty bedrock.  In fact, the right had been made 
flesh in the very process of ordaining the Constitution itself — a proc-
ess in which the freest speech imaginable flowed for a year across the 
continent, an outpouring that went miles beyond English common law 
rights of expression for common Englishmen.100 
Thus the “freedom of speech” language from the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689 changed its shape when it crossed an ocean, aged a cen-
tury, and was codified in the American Bill of Rights of 1789.  The 
First Amendment borrowed language from England, reworded it to 
some degree, and infused it with distinctly American (and relatively 
new) ideas about popular sovereignty and federalism.  If all this was 
true of the First Amendment, why couldn’t it be equally true of the 
Second? 
4.  Holism and America’s Other Constitutions. — Perhaps the evi-
dentiary gap in Justice Scalia’s argument could have been filled by a 
long list of pre-1789 state constitutions echoing and constitutionalizing 
(albeit at the state level) the English common law right of arms for 
self-defense.  But here, too, the evidence tends to cut against Justice 
Scalia.  Most state constitutions discussed the right to bear arms in 
military and militia-related contexts.101  Only two states, Pennsylvania 
and Vermont, appeared to affirm an individual constitutional right to a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 97 Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 98  See  id. at 2798 n.16 (majority opinion). 
 99 See AMAR, supra note 11, at 24–26, 223–25. 
 100 Cf. English Bill of Rights, supra note 91, § 9 (“[T]he Freedom of Speech, and Debates or 
Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of 
Parliament.”). 
 101 See AMAR, supra note 11, at 332 n.33. 
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gun for self-defense, and they did so in language quite different from 
the Second Amendment.102 
Justice Scalia had better luck identifying a variety of other pre-
1789 sources using the phrase “bear arms” in nonmilitary contexts.103  
The point is key because Justice Stevens would apparently deny Dick 
Heller’s claim even if Heller were in an organized militia, on the 
ground that Heller sought to use his gun for a nonmilitary reason, self-
defense.104  But virtually none of Justice Scalia’s pre-1789 sources in-
volved use of the simple phrase “bear arms” without more.  If we con-
fine ourselves to evidence prior to 1789 (or 1791, when the Amend-
ment was ratified), Justice Scalia had no knock-down response to 
Justice Stevens, who noted that the unadorned phrase “bear arms” 
most naturally has a military connotation, especially when used in le-
gal sources.105  Indeed, Justice Scalia had no knock-down response to 
himself, for Justice Stevens scored a direct hit when he quoted the lan-
guage of an earlier Scalia dissent: “The Court does not appear to grasp 
the distinction between how a word can be used and how it is ordinar-
ily used.”106 
5.  Holism and Post-Founding History. — The best evidence that 
the right to bear arms, in ordinary usage, had encompassed an indi-
vidual right to self-defense à la England came from a boatload of post-
1791 state constitutions, state case law, and legal commentaries that 
Justice Scalia cited or quoted at length.107  But this later commentary 
is at best imperfect evidence of what the American people meant when 
they discussed, drafted, and ratified an arms-bearing amendment in 
the years between 1787 and 1791.  Yes, 1810 was a long time ago, and 
pretty close to 1791 from our perspective.  But if a future twenty-third-
century historian seeks to understand the 1960s, I hope she does not 
treat the 1980s as decisive evidence.  Even if most commentators in 
the years after 1791 read the Second Amendment through the prism of 
English common law and individual rights of self-defense, this ap-
proach may well have been anachronistic and incorrect.   
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 102 See PA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and 
the State shall not be questioned.”); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16 (“[T]he people have a right to bear 
arms for the defence of themselves and the State.”).  Although Vermont did ratify the Second 
Amendment, it did not become a state until 1791 and thus played no role in the discussions lead-
ing up to the Amendment in the various state ratifying conventions of 1787–1788 or in the actual 
drafting of the Amendment by the First Congress in 1789. 
 103 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2795 & n.10. 
 104 See id. at 2822–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 105 Id. at 2828–29.  
 106 Id. at 2829 n.11 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J.,  
dissenting)). 
 107 See id. at 2803–12 (majority opinion). 
  
174 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:145  
A quick look at Justice Scalia’s post-1791 materials confirms that 
several of the most prominent sources did indeed distort the 1787–1791 
public meaning.  Many of the cited jurists and commentators read the 
Second Amendment’s operative command as binding state govern-
ments, contra the orthodox public understanding of those who drafted 
and ratified the Bill of Rights — orthodoxy honored in John Mar-
shall’s canonical 1833 opinion in Barron v. Baltimore.108  Other com-
mentary that Justice Scalia cited proclaimed slavery itself unconstitu-
tional.109  Now, slavery was many things, but hardly unconstitutional 
(at least for an originalist).  The very title of one work that Justice 
Scalia prominently invoked — “A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality 
of American Slavery” — should have tipped him off that something 
was amiss.  If these commentators and courts got such big issues 
hugely wrong, then why should we heed what they had to say about 
more subtle and fine-grained issues?  All these post-ratification sources 
are merely of persuasive authority, and here we have reasons to ques-
tion their general reliability. 
In other contexts, Justice Scalia would make mincemeat out of such 
unorthodox accounts of the Constitution.  But locked as he was  
in gladiatorial combat with Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia reached for 
any weapon at hand, and saw these post-1791 sources as handy objects  
to hurl at his opponent without noticing that many of them were  
boomerangs. 
6.  A Better Brand of Holism: Remembering the Ninth and Four-
teenth Amendments. — Yet for all these problems, Justice Scalia 
reached the right answer.  Under proper originalist and textualist 
ground rules, the Constitution should indeed be read to protect  an in-
dividual right to have a gun at home for self-defense. 
Once again, the key is to read the Constitution in a holistic fashion 
and to widen our analysis beyond the Second Amendment.  Consider 
two additional amendments, largely ignored by Justice Scalia, that 
strongly support his conclusions, shoring up the weak flanks of his ar-
gument that the previous pages have sought to expose. 
True, the link between the opening and closing language of the 
Second Amendment is rather loose on Justice Scalia’s reading.  Also 
true, various antebellum sources may have distorted the original public 
meaning of the Second Amendment.  But now add (as Justice Scalia 
did not, alas) the Ninth Amendment to the mix.  This Amendment was 
a response to Founding-era concerns that textual enumerations and 
codifications of various rights might be construed in an unduly stingy 
manner so as to disparage implicit constitutional rights or other un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 108 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 109 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2807. 
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enumerated rights.  The Ninth Amendment’s text does not quite say 
that “the enumeration in the Constitution of certain purposes of rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage other purposes for those 
rights.”  But it does say something rather similar,110 and it was de-
signed to reassure the American public that the fundamental rights 
that they believed they already had would not be lost merely because 
only some of these rights were explicitly enumerated or because others 
were narrowly worded.  Even if the English common law right of self-
defense was different than the Second Amendment right, many Ameri-
cans in the Founding era may have believed they had both rights — 
and the Ninth Amendment was designed to reassure such Americans 
that unduly narrow interpretations of the protected rights would be 
disfavored.  And even if later Americans in the antebellum period were 
demonstrably mistaken about the correct reading of the Second 
Amendment as originally understood, their widespread mistake about 
the scope of their fundamental rights and their evident celebration of 
an individual right of arms for self-defense should be protected by the 
Ninth Amendment.111 
Now add the Fourteenth Amendment to the mix.  This Amend-
ment proclaimed that all citizens would be protected in all their fun-
damental “privileges” and “immunities” — that is, in all their most es-
sential rights and freedoms.  The Amendment explicitly protected 
these fundamental freedoms against states (“No state shall . . .”), but its 
drafters and ratifiers also believed and said that the federal govern-
ment was equally obliged to respect these fundamental rights.  Recon-
struction Republicans insisted that these fundamental rights inhered in 
the very fact of American citizenship.112  These rights thus found shel-
ter in the sweeping text of the Fourteenth Amendment’s first sentence, 
which proclaimed all those born or naturalized in America to be full 
and equal citizens at both the state and federal level.  To be a citizen 
was ipso facto to have fundamental rights, and this basic principle  
went without saying where rights against the federal government were 
concerned.113  (The “No state” language was added as an explicit limit 
on states because the Supreme Court, in Barron v. Baltimore, had pre-
viously made clear that constitutional rights against states did not al-
ways go without saying.  According to Barron, various rights guaran-
teed against the federal government did not apply against states in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 110  “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 111 See supra section I.A.4, p. 162–64. 
 112 See generally AMAR, supra note 11, at 195–96 n.*, 281–82 & n.*. 
 113 See id.  
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absence of express constitutional language to that effect, language akin 
to the “No state shall” language found in Article I, Section 10.114) 
The Fourteenth Amendment did not itemize the privileges and 
immunities of American citizenship.  Instead, like the Ninth, the Four-
teenth invited interpreters to pay close attention to fundamental rights 
that Americans had affirmed through their lived experience and had 
memorialized in state bills of rights and in other canonical texts such 
as the Declaration of Independence and landmark civil rights legisla-
tion.  And when it came to guns, a landmark companion statute to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, enacted by Congress in 1866, declared that 
“the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws . . . concerning 
personal liberty [and] personal security . . . including the constitutional 
right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citi-
zens.”115  Here, in sharp contrast to the general tenor of Founding-era 
legal texts, the “bear arms” phrase was decisively and undeniably sev-
ered from the military context in a high-profile legal setting.  Women 
as well as men could claim a “personal” right to protect their “personal 
liberty” and “personal security” in their homes.  (Note the Fourth 
Amendment–style language and imagery infusing this restatement of 
the “bear arms” rights.) 
The Reconstruction-era Congress emphasized that Southern blacks 
might need guns in their homes to protect themselves from private vio-
lence in places where they could not rely on local constables to keep 
their neighborhoods safe.  When guns were outlawed, only outlaw 
Klansmen would have guns.  This critical chapter in the history of 
American liberty furnishes compelling evidence of an individual right 
to have a gun in one’s home, regardless of the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment.116 
Interestingly enough, several of the sources upon which the Recon-
struction Republicans relied were the very antebellum sources that 
Justice Scalia cited.117  As we have seen, these sources provide rather 
dubious evidence of what most Americans thought the Second 
Amendment meant when ratified.118  Yet many of these very same 
sources provide solid evidence of what Americans did in fact think the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to confirm and accomplish.  If 
the key text is the Fourteenth Amendment, these sources are not mere 
post-enactment misreadings of the Founders’ meaning, but rather pre-
enactment evidence of the Reconstruction amenders’ vision.  Thus 
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 114 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248–49 (1833).   
 115 Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176. 
 116 See AMAR, supra note 11, at 257–68. 
 117 Many of these sources are discussed in great detail as preludes to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in AMAR, supra note 11, at 145–62, 257–66. 
 118 See supra p. 174. 
  
2008] THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENTS 177 
 
when Justice Stevens pooh-poohed various post–Civil War material 
cited by the Court as “better characterized as advocacy than good-faith 
attempts at constitutional interpretation,”119 Justice Scalia should have 
countered that these sources are “best characterized as part of the Civil 
War amendment process through which America experienced a new 
birth of freedom and reglossed the Bill of Rights.” 
7.  Holism and Harvard. — All this leaves us with a puzzle: If add-
ing the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the mix would have 
dramatically strengthened Justice Scalia’s opinion from an originalist 
perspective, then why did he omit these holistic strengtheners? 
As for the Ninth, perhaps he felt that reawakening one long-
dormant part of the Bill of Rights was quite enough for a day’s work.  
But if the quest is to get the Second Amendment right and to take se-
riously the process by which Americans agreed to that Amendment, 
then consideration of the Ninth, drafted and ratified alongside the 
Second, is simply part of the mission.120 
Or perhaps it might be said that precedent forecloses judicial re-
course to the Ninth Amendment.  But no Court case squarely bars re-
liance on the Ninth, and even if it did, the Ninth, no less than the Sec-
ond, is ultimately higher law than any mere case.121  In fact, precedent 
does exist for reading the Ninth in conjunction with another part of 
the Bill of Rights: Chief Justice Burger’s 1980 plurality opinion in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia notably invoked the Ninth 
Amendment alongside the First in support of a right of the public and 
the press to attend criminal trials.122  Harvard Law School deserves 
much of the credit for this revival of the Ninth — the Ninth Amend-
ment argument was presented to the Court by Harvard’s greatest gift 
to modern constitutional theory and practice, Professor Laurence 
Tribe.123 
But for much of its history in the pre-Tribe era, Harvard played a 
less admirable role in educating its students — and through them, the 
American legal profession — about the proper meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment and about that Amendment’s relationship to the 
Bill of Rights.  The Fourteenth was written and intended to make 
various parts of the Bill of Rights applicable against states, particu-
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 119 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 120 Justice Scalia offered a crabbed view of the Ninth Amendment’s justiciability in his dissent 
in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), but his Troxel opinion did not consider how the Ninth 
might properly be considered by judges in conjunction with a textual right.  See id. at 91–93 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 121 Nor would any proper reliance interests bar recourse to the Ninth. 
 122 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980). 
 123 See Brief of Appellants at 53–59, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (No. 79-243).  See 
generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Tribute to Larry Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV. 801 (2007). 
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larly those parts that proclaimed the rights of individuals (as distinct 
from the rights of states themselves).  In the process of “incorporating” 
these rights against states, the Fourteenth also reglossed the earlier 
amendments and gave America a more liberal, more individualistic 
Bill of Rights than did the Founders.  The story of how arms-bearing 
became a more individualistic right during Reconstruction is merely 
one part of a much larger story of how the Fourteenth transformed the 
Bill.124 
Yet this is likely not the story that Antonin Scalia learned when he 
studied at Harvard and served as an editor of the Harvard Law Re-
view.  Back then, the views of Harvard Law School Professor Charles 
Fairman held sway in Cambridge, and Fairman’s work badly distorted 
the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment and its intimate rela-
tionship to the Bill of Rights.125  In these distortions, Fairman received 
strong support from his mentor, Felix Frankfurter, whose brilliant ca-
reer was tightly interwoven with the Harvard Law Review.  Frank-
furter had served as a student editor on Volume 19 of the Review and 
later acted as an informal academic advisor to HLR while on the Har-
vard Law School faculty, during which period he laid the foundations 
for what would ultimately become the annual HLR Supreme Court  
issue.  Once on the Court, he relied heavily on Fairman’s work in a 
crusade to discredit scholarship and judicial opinions demonstrating 
the key linkages between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.126 
In starting his career as an HLR editor and ending it as a Supreme 
Court Justice, and in paying insufficient attention to the Fourteenth 
Amendment even though it has a great deal to teach us about the Bill 
of Rights, Antonin Scalia is thus part of a tradition. 
Nor is he the only one.   
II.  BEYOND THE DUEL: ROBERTS, BREYER, AND GINSBURG 
A.  The Politic Manager 
Exactly thirty years ago, John G. Roberts, Jr., served as the Manag-
ing Editor of the Harvard Law Review, with authority to divide the 
editorial workload among staff members.127  Now he serves as the 
managing Justice of the United States, with similar authority to divide 
the judicial workload.   
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 124 The story is told in detail in AMAR, supra note 11. 
 125 This is, I admit, a harsh assessment of Fairman, but one that I have tried to detail and de-
fend at length elsewhere.  See id. at 183 & n.*, 187–93, 197–207, 303.  
 126 This story is well told in Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (1995). 
 127 David Leebron served as HLR President for Volume 92. 
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As one of the most anticipated cases of the decade, Heller was 
surely a plum.  Yet the Chief Justice did not reserve the majority opin-
ion for himself.  Nor did he give the assignment to the Court’s swing 
voter, Justice Kennedy, who has been in the majority in virtually every 
notable 5–4 case decided in the last three terms.  (De facto, the Roberts 
Court thus far is the Kennedy Court — a reminder that even those 
who do not start their legal careers on the Harvard Law Review can 
amount to something.)  Instead, Roberts gave the plum to the most 
senior Associate Justice on his side, an Associate Justice who is also the 
Court’s most senior originalist/textualist. 
With this act of judicial modesty, the Chief Justice showed shrewd 
judgment.  John Roberts is a former appellate advocate par excellence 
and more a doctrinalist (and also, perhaps, a pragmatist) than an 
originalist.  But in a case where no previous Court decision shed much 
light on the big issues at stake, the assignment sensibly went to a Jus-
tice whose preferred methodology better fit the task at hand.  The first 
big opinion in a field, if done well, can lay out the first principles of 
constitutional text, history, and structure, and an originalist/textualist 
judge is well-suited to this task.  Once the foundation has been prop-
erly laid, later cases can begin to build on it.  Doctrinalist skills be-
come particularly useful as the judicial inquiry shifts from first princi-
ples to fine points.  Many of the Second Amendment cases to come 
will revolve around the doctrinal tiers, tests, and formulas that domi-
nate appellate case law.  There will be time enough for Chief Justice 
Roberts and other nonoriginalists to take the lead.128 
But giving the Heller assignment to Antonin Scalia also meant giv-
ing the opinion to a quintessentially confrontational Justice.  The word 
“confrontation” itself loomed large both in Justice Scalia’s Heller opin-
ion129 and in a Confrontation Clause decision he handed down one day 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 128 Cf. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 55 (1982) (observing that “reasoning from 
purpose . . . gives doctrinalism its power; it can’t provide purpose” in the same way that original-
ism often can); cf. also id. at 49 (“[A Court composed only of classical doctrinalists] sounds more 
like the word of the Harvard Law Review: a group of industrious but largely convictionless stu-
dents arriving at results.”).  Philip Bobbitt and John Roberts clerked for the same Second Circuit 
judge, a judge who himself had begun his legal career as President of the Harvard Law Review.  
See infra p. 181. 
 129 Justice Scalia limited recognition of an individual right to keep arms to situations of self-
defense involving “confrontation” — that is, “conflict with another person” — as distinct from, 
say, hunting or recreation.  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 
U.S. 125, 143 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The word was no casual slip; it ap-
peared, with variations, a total of five times in Scalia’s opinion.  See id. at 2793, 2796, 2797, 2799, 
2819.  As in Crawford, whose methodological similarity to Heller was noted at supra p. 152, Jus-
tice Scalia saw the Framers as his kind of guys — manly men who envisioned and to some extent 
celebrated face-to-face conflicts. 
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earlier, Giles v. California.130  More important still, Justice Scalia’s 
style throughout Heller — and, frankly, throughout many of his finest 
opinions — is markedly combative, giving no quarter to the other side.  
Justice Scalia succeeded in holding a majority together in Heller, but 
he did little to broaden the coalition beyond the necessary five.  At 
times, he seemed more intent on belittling, or at least besting, the dis-
senters than on persuading them.131 
In this situation, an artful concurrence might have been particu-
larly valuable.  The Chief Justice could have penned his own supple-
mental analysis placing more emphasis on the Fourteenth Amendment 
as an open invitation to the members of the Court’s more liberal wing 
to join the majority’s outcome on an alternative theory.  Political liber-
als would likely have been more apt to embrace the Fourteenth 
Amendment than the Second, given that the Fourteenth has been the 
font of so many politically liberal results. 
Legal purists might wonder whether it is ever proper for a Justice 
to strategize in terms of judicial coalitions and political wings.  But if 
anyone may properly attend to the institutional desirability of achiev-
ing wider Court consensus, it would be the Chief Justice.  And nothing 
in the concurrence that we are imagining would have rested on im-
proper legal arguments.  On the contrary, a Fourteenth Amendment 
approach might have been both more legally satisfying and more poli-
tic for a Court seeking to transcend political divisions and culture 
wars. 
True, the Fourteenth Amendment theory would have been a more 
sweeping basis for the outcome in Heller and thus in tension with 
Chief Justice Roberts’s professed goal of deciding issues narrowly.  But 
greater sweep here might have achieved another of the Chief’s pro-
fessed goals: consensus.132  Sometimes a narrow decision can facilitate 
consensus, as in last Term’s Indiana voter ID case, Crawford v. Marion 
County Election Board.133  But other times, as perhaps could have 
been the case in Heller, consensus is best reached by a big tent that 
broadens the judicial analysis. 
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 130 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681 (2008) (“We consider whether [under Crawford] a defendant forfeits his 
right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a wrongful act by the de-
fendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial.”).  
 131 See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2790 n.5 (declaring that Justice Stevens was “dead wrong” on 
a point — a phrase never before used in the United States Reports to describe a member of the 
Court). 
 132 See Linda Greenhouse, In Latest Term, Majority Grows to More than Five of the Justices, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A1.   
 133 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, and Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opin-
ion joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, yielding a 6–3 decision.  See id. at 1615 (holding only 
that “the evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the validity of the 
entire statute”). 
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Had the Chief succeeded in bringing the dissenters along via a 
Fourteenth Amendment theory, the Court could have made explicit 
what it only hinted at in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion: that the 
right to arms for self-defense applies fully against the states.134  Such 
an explicit ruling would also have required the Court to squarely over-
rule an 1876 case that became an indefensible legal derelict long ago.  
United States v. Cruikshank135 held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not protect an individual arms-bearing right — or any other right 
in the first eight amendments, for that matter — against states.136  
Cruikshank’s general vision has been repudiated by the Court in hun-
dreds of cases involving the other parts of the Bill of Rights that have 
been fully incorporated against the states.  After Heller, it is hard to 
conceive how Cruikshank can still stand, so a Fourteenth Amendment 
concurrence would not really have swept further — just faster.  Also, 
such a concurrence would have provided greater legal clarity, eliminat-
ing any confusion that may now exist among lower courts that might 
still feel formally bound by Cruikshank — despite Heller’s winks, 
nods, and logic — until the Supreme Court incants the magic words 
“hereby overruled.” 
So why did the Chief Justice not show even more leadership in 
Heller via a Fourteenth Amendment concurrence?  Perhaps he might 
have found driving the final nail in Cruikshank’s coffin an especially 
awkward task given his legal lineage.  Here, too, the ghosts of Frank-
furter and HLR hover above the current Court. 
Twenty-nine years ago, immediately after his tenure as HLR’s 
Managing Editor, John Roberts served as a law clerk to Judge Henry 
Friendly, who himself had served as an HLR President and who was 
quite possibly the greatest twentieth-century jurist never to sit on the 
Supreme Court.  Friendly was perhaps Felix Frankfurter’s most nota-
ble protégé, and although Friendly was far more careful than Frank-
furter before him, Friendly, too, balked at the idea that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights fully applicable 
against states.137  Roberts’s next boss, then-Associate Justice William 
H. Rehnquist, was even more hostile to incorporation, at least in his 
early years.  As an undergraduate at Stanford, Rehnquist had studied 
directly under Charles Fairman and had enthusiastically imbibed 
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 134 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23, 2816. 
 135 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 136 See id. at 553 (“[The Second Amendment] is one of the amendments that has no other effect 
than to restrict the powers of the national government.” (emphasis added)). 
 137 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. 
REV. 929, 933–38 (1965). 
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many of his mentor’s ideas.138  Years later, as a young Associate Jus-
tice, Rehnquist at times openly refused to accept the Warren Court’s 
incorporation jurisprudence, marking him as the last Justice to pro-
claim the validity of Frankfurter’s and Fairman’s theories in the pages 
of the United States Reports.139 
Even more than Antonin Scalia, then, John Roberts is by his train-
ing part of a tradition closely associated with the Harvard Law Re-
view, a tradition that has, alas, misread the central meaning of the cen-
tral amendment of the U.S. Constitution.140 
B.  The Democratic Pragmatist 
Stephen Breyer served as Articles Editor of the Harvard Law Re-
view in 1963–1964141 and the next year clerked on the Supreme Court 
for Justice Arthur Goldberg, who had recently filled the vacancy cre-
ated by the retirement of Justice Frankfurter.  Halfway into this clerk-
ship year, Frankfurter’s final published work poignantly appeared in 
print only days before his death under the title Memorandum on “In-
corporation” of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.142  The Memorandum, published (where else!) 
in the Harvard Law Review, had been prepared several years earlier 
with the assistance of Justice Frankfurter’s then-clerk, John D. 
French,143 who had served as HLR President when Antonin Scalia 
was Notes Editor.  In Frankfurter’s words, the Memorandum pulled 
together a wide “collection of Supreme Court cases rejecting claims 
that one or another or all of the specific provisions of the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution apply to the States through implicit 
adoption by, or ‘incorporation’ in, the Fourteenth.”144 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 138 See Charles Lane, Head of the Class, STAN. MAG., July–Aug. 2005, available at http:// 
www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2005/julaug/features/rehnquist.html (“‘Charles Fairman 
is a big piece of the story of Bill Rehnquist at Stanford,’ says John Q. Barrett, a law professor at 
St. John’s University who interviewed Rehnquist as part of his research on Justice Jackson. ‘He 
was his very influential role model and teacher as an undergraduate.’”). 
 139 See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 535 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing with approval Fairman’s anti-incorporation scholarship). 
 140 If you doubt that some version of incorporation was part of the central meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, please read AMAR, supra note 11, at 137–307.  If you doubt that the 
Fourteenth is our central amendment, please conduct the following simple experiment.  Pick the 
eight to ten cases you think are most important on issues of civil rights and civil liberties.  I pre-
dict that the great majority of the cases you pick will be cases involving states and localities — 
Fourteenth Amendment cases, strictly speaking. 
 141 The other Articles Editor for Volume 77 was Frederic J. Truslow.  Michael Boudin was 
HLR President that year. 
 142 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965). 
 143 See id. at 746. 
 144 Id. 
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The Memorandum failed to sway a majority of the Court.  Justice 
Goldberg and his successor, Justice Abe Fortas — neither of whom 
had strong ties to HLR or to Frankfurterian ideology — became the 
fifth votes on the Warren Court for what eventually became a tidal 
wave of cases applying almost all individual-rights provisions of the 
first eight amendments with full force against state and local govern-
ments.  After this tidal wave between 1963 and 1969, only three sig-
nificant rights remained to be applied against the states: the Fifth 
Amendment right to grand juries, the Seventh Amendment right to 
civil juries, and the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. 
Given that Stephen Breyer came of age just as this tidal wave was 
hitting; given that the wave began as and because Justice Goldberg re-
placed Justice Frankfurter; given that Justice Breyer currently holds 
the very Court seat once held by Justices Frankfurter, Goldberg, and 
Fortas — given all this, one might have expected Stephen Breyer to be 
particularly intrigued by the Fourteenth Amendment angle on the Bill 
of Rights in general and on the right to keep and bear arms, one of its 
last unincorporated rights, in particular.  One might also have expected 
Justice Breyer to find the Ninth Amendment angle intriguing, given 
that the first prominent mention of the amendment on the modern 
Court appeared in Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,145 decided the very year that Stephen Breyer clerked.  
If these issues did intrigue Justice Breyer, he showed few signs of it 
in his separate Heller dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg.146  The omission is particularly unfortunate because a more 
direct engagement with the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments could 
have helped Justice Breyer refine several of the themes evident in his 
Heller opinion and in his earlier oeuvre. 
Stephen Breyer is a pragmatist.147  But as with doctrinalism, 
pragmatism works best when it seeks to vindicate the larger purposes 
and values of the Constitution itself.  Rather than usurping the Consti-
tution’s authority to make ultimate choices of value and purpose, ap-
propriately constrained pragmatism leads to bounded instrumentalist 
judgments guided by the Constitution’s own purposes, premises, pro-
tocols, and procedures. 
Even if he or she were not bound by oath and honor to follow the 
Constitution, a truly wise pragmatic judge would choose to follow it 
because the document distills the wisdom of the American people over 
the course of centuries.  Unfortunately, the preeminent exponent of le-
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 145 381 U.S. 479, 486–93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (discussing the history and role of the 
Ninth Amendment). 
 146 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 147 Full disclosure: I clerked for then-Judge Breyer on the First Circuit in 1984–1985. 
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gal pragmatism today, the extraordinary Judge Richard Posner, has of-
ten failed to appreciate the wisdom of the document.148  Now, Richard 
Posner is a very smart man. (Let the record show that he, too, served 
as President of HLR — during Stephen Breyer’s first year as a Har-
vard law student.149)  But the Constitution is wise, and wise pragmatic 
judges become wiser still when they study the Constitution with great 
care. 
Stephen Breyer is just the sort of wise pragmatist who has a proper 
sense of humility and a respect for the wisdom of the people as ex-
pressed in democratic decisionmaking.  He often seeks to defer to de-
mocratic processes.150  Because the Constitution itself embodies prin-
ciples that have already passed an extraordinarily demanding 
democratic test — the test of democratic ratification — these principles 
deserve a special measure of judicial regard in any proper democratic 
calculus. 
In his Heller dissent, Justice Breyer explained that he was loath to 
overturn the D.C. ordinance because “legislators, not judges, have 
primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical 
fact.”151  This is a grand Frankfurterian thought, but Justice Breyer 
himself has not always abided by it, as is evident in his stance in the 
partial-birth abortion cases.152 
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 148 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33 (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) 
— scene of a famous duel between Justices Frankfurter and Black over incorporation — for the 
opposite of the case’s actual holding, and garbling other textual and historical issues related to 
incorporation).   
 149 Posner’s Volume opened with a tribute essay to Learned Hand by Felix Frankfurter, fea-
tured a Foreword by Frankfurter’s prior clerk Alexander M. Bickel, showcased a three-part series 
by Frankfurter’s protégé Henry J. Friendly, and contained yet another article by yet another 
Frankfurter acolyte, Louis L. Jaffe.  Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1961); 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. 
L. REV. 40 (1961); Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better 
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1962); Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1962); 
Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Stan-
dards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263 (1962); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private 
Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961). 
 150 See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2860–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]eference to legislative 
judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where the judgment has been made by a local leg-
islature, with particular knowledge of local problems and insight into appropriate local solu-
tions. . . . We owe that democratic process some substantial weight in the constitutional calcu-
lus.”); cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 841 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (deferring to 
school board drug testing policy adopted via “public meetings” and a “democratic, participatory 
process”).  See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A DEMOC-
RATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). 
 151 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2860 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 152 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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Justice Breyer also claimed in Heller that “[t]he Framers recognized 
that the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of govern-
ment.”153  It is unclear whether this Anti-Federalist vision was in fact 
shared by most Federalists at the Founding.  But even if most Framers 
did recognize this, did the Reconstruction generation?  Unless Justice 
Breyer’s willingness to defer to local lawmakers is boundless, he 
needed to tell us when deference is less appropriate.  Here he could 
have enlisted the Fourteenth Amendment, and even the Ninth, for that 
matter. 
Though Justice Breyer plausibly believed that the Founders’ Sec-
ond Amendment had little to do with individual self-defense, this be-
lief should not have ended the case for him.  He still should have reck-
oned with those clauses of the Constitution protecting unenumerated 
rights.  When identifying the Ninth Amendment’s unenumerated 
rights “retained by the people,”154 a judge should not decide what he 
or she personally thinks would be a proper set of rights.  Instead, the 
judge should ask which rights have been recognized by the American 
people themselves through, for example, state constitutions and bills of 
rights, landmark civil rights laws, and customs established merely by 
living their lives freely across the country and over the centuries.  
Many of our most basic rights are simply facts of life, the residue of a 
virtually unchallenged pattern and practice on the ground in domains 
where citizens act freely and governments lie low.  When a judge looks 
to sources such as these, the judge is acting in a democratically defer-
ential fashion by consulting the actual practices and principles of the 
people themselves. 
Consider, for example, one of the biggest cases decided during 
Breyer’s clerkship year, Griswold v. Connecticut.  Connecticut crimi-
nalized the use of contraception even by married couples, prompting 
the Supreme Court to strike down the extraordinarily intrusive state 
law as unconstitutional.  Writing separately in Griswold, the second 
Justice Harlan incorporated by reference an earlier opinion in which 
he had explained that the “conclusive” factor for him was “the utter 
novelty of [Connecticut’s] enactment.  Although the Federal Govern-
ment and many States have . . . forbidd[en] or regulat[ed] the distribu-
tion of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has made the use of 
contraceptives a crime.”155  For Harlan, the basic practice of the 
American people rendered Connecticut’s oddball law presumptively 
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 153 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2861 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 n.18 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 154 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 155 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), incorporated by reference in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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unconstitutional.  Today, nearly a dozen state constitutions156 and 
countless statutes speak explicitly of a right to privacy — a right no-
where explicitly mentioned in the federal Constitution but surely one 
embraced by the people in principle and practice. 
Now take Justice Harlan’s sensible approach to the unenumerated 
right of privacy and apply it to Heller’s claim that he has a right to 
have a gun in his D.C. home for self-defense.157  Americans have, in 
fact, enacted lots of gun regulations, but few outright prohibitions of 
guns in homes as sweeping as the D.C. ordinance.  The people have 
affirmed a right to keep guns in many modern state constitutions.  
Unlike most Founding-era documents, these modern texts routinely use 
the phrase “bear arms” outside the military context to protect, for ex-
ample, guns for hunting, recreation, and/or self-defense.158 
Here, then, are a couple of advantages for someone with Justice 
Breyer’s sensibilities of trying to shift the focus away from the Second 
Amendment and towards the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
First, a Ninth-and-Fourteenth Amendment framework is more modest.  
Unusually draconian gun laws could be struck down because they lie 
outside the lived pattern of the American experience, while more 
mainstream gun laws could be upheld precisely because they have 
been accepted by the people in many places.  If our nation’s capital 
wants to argue that specially strict gun rules should apply there be-
cause the city faces unique risks, no rigid textual language from the 
Second Amendment would prevent judges from considering its prag-
matic claims in the course of interpreting the boundaries of actual 
American practice.  Once Justice Breyer rejected the Second Amend-
ment, the question, strictly speaking, should have shifted to defining 
the precise contours of the Fourteenth Amendment “privilege” and the 
Ninth Amendment unenumerated “right” of gun possession for self-
defense.  By contrast, if the Second Amendment’s language really did 
guarantee a right to guns in homes for non-military use, by what au-
thority could judges allow a different approach in D.C.?159 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 See Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1324, 1430 n.5 (1982) (listing constitutional provisions in ten states).  A similar list appears 
in Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1085, 1130 n.276 (2002).  
 157 For a similar effort to assess Heller in light of Griswold, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme 
Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller As Griswold, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 246 (2008). 
 158 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 902 n.37, and sources cited therein. 
 159 Justice Breyer tried to point to Founding-era evidence that urban areas were allowed 
greater discretion to restrict firearms, see Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2848–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but 
his evidence was thin and doubtful. 
  True, the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporated” the Second, and thus the Second applies 
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Second, the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments are more modern 
and democratically responsive.  The Ninth Amendment invites us to 
consider not only rights that have long been part of the American tra-
dition, but also rights that have emerged in more recent practice or in 
state constitutional clauses of more recent vintage that are relatively 
easy to amend.160  The Fourteenth Amendment directs our attention to 
the still-relevant problems of race and police protection or the absence 
thereof.  The Second Amendment, however, harkens back to a lost 
eighteenth-century America where citizens regularly mustered for mili-
tia service on the town square and where a federal army was rightly 
suspect.  This is not our world, as even Justice Scalia seemed to ac-
knowledge in his closing passage.161 
C.  The Soft-Spoken Feminist 
As a second-year student at Harvard Law School, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg became an editor of the Harvard Law Review in 1957,162 but 
family circumstances impelled her to complete her legal studies at Co-
lumbia Law School, where she served as an editor of the Columbia 
Law Review.  Later winning acclaim for her pathbreaking litigation 
success on behalf of sex equality, Ginsburg now sits as a Justice on the 
very Court she once helped to persuade as a crusading lawyer.  Yet in 
Heller, this great advocate fell silent.  Justice Ginsburg could have im-
proved the Court’s deliberations had she raised, as she has so often in 
her career, the “woman” question. 
As explained above, focusing on women would have clarified the 
proper meaning of the word “people” in the Second Amendment.  To 
start, it would have highlighted the awkwardness of reading eight-
eenth-century women into an amendment that, unlike the Fourth, was 
not designed with women in mind.163  Furthermore, focusing on 
women would have clarified that the Fourteenth Amendment was cen-
tered on a civil right of self-defense for all citizens, male and female, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Second Amendment, but rather the Second’s basic individual right as refracted through the prism 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges” and “immunities.”  And the precise contours of these 
“privileges” and “immunities” are properly measured by examining actual American practices, 
state constitutional provisions, and so on.  For much more analysis of this “refined incorporation,” 
see AMAR, supra note 11, at 215–83. 
 160 Most state constitutional protections of arms-bearing for hunting are the recent product of 
pro-gun social movements.  For more on these movements, see Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme 
Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Dead or Alive: Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).  
 161 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (“Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment is 
outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation.”). 
 162 Richard N. Goodwin served as HLR President for Volume 71. 
 163 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.  
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whether or not these citizens were serving, had ever served, or would 
ever serve in an actual mustering militia. 
Finally, asking the woman question might have shifted some atten-
tion to issues of collective arms-bearing outside the home, and in par-
ticular to questions concerning the role of women in America’s twenty-
first-century military structure.  Justices Ginsburg and Scalia have al-
ready begun to debate these issues in the United States Reports.  But 
first, a quick bit of background. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia have a history.  Though 
they did not serve on the same HLR Board, they did overlap as stu-
dents at Harvard Law School.164  After Harvard, both became well-
respected law professors, and for four years they sat together on the 
D.C. Circuit.  Justice Scalia reached the Supreme Court first, but ap-
parently he never forgot his friend.  When coyly asked, in the context 
of a Court vacancy, whether he would prefer to be stranded on a de-
sert island with Laurence Tribe or Mario Cuomo, Scalia famously an-
swered, “Ruth Bader Ginsburg.”165 
In 1996, the two friends dueled over the role of women in military 
academies.  Writing for the Court in the VMI case, United States v. 
Virginia,166 Ginsburg properly read the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equality guarantee to condemn a system in which Virginia woefully 
failed to offer its women equal opportunities for education in military 
matters and political leadership.  Justice Scalia stood alone in dissent. 
The VMI case reminds us that linkages continue to exist between 
military leadership and political leadership even in the modern world.  
VMI began as a military academy, but today its chief role is to train 
leaders.167  Military leaders are often perceived as particularly experi-
enced and credentialed to serve as political leaders.  To exclude women 
from military service is thus to handicap them in the political arena. 
In short, those who do not fight are often seen as having lesser 
rights to vote and to lead.168  Thus we return to the classical republi-
can vision underlying the Second Amendment, a vision that linked 
military and political participation.  Women at the Founding were ex-
cluded from both. 
But now, thanks to the Nineteenth Amendment, women are full 
political equals, with rights to vote, to be voted for, to serve in elective 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 164 Ginsburg attended Harvard from 1956 until 1958, when she transferred to Columbia.  
Scalia attended Harvard from 1957 until his graduation in 1960. 
 165 See Margaret Carlson, The Law According to Ruth, TIME, June 28, 1993, at 38, 40. 
 166 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 167 See id. at 520–22. 
 168 For more on the interdependence of the political rights to vote, serve in the military, hold 
office, and sit on juries, see AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, supra note 89, 
at 399–400 & n.*, 426–28, 612 n.106; AMAR, supra note 11, at 48 & n.*, 49, 216–18, 258–61, 271–
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office, and to serve on juries.169  They should also have a full and 
equal right to serve in the military.  The Nineteenth Amendment ex-
panded “the people” for Article I, Section 2 voting purposes, and the 
Second Amendment says that in general, these very same “people” — 
the voters — should form the republic’s basic military structure.170  
Thus the Second and Nineteenth Amendments, when read together 
holistically, affirm the political and military equality of men and 
women. 
Justice Scalia in Heller scoffed at the idea that the “right to bear 
arms” might mean a right to serve in the military instead of, or even  
in addition to, a right to carry a gun.171  He read the Second Amend-
ment to cover liberty (the right to protect oneself) and property (the 
right to protect one’s home).  But the Amendment as originally un-
derstood was not purely libertarian.  It was also republican.  It was 
about equality as well as liberty, about public service as well as private 
property.  
Here’s the key point: this idea of military and political equality was 
at the heart of the VMI case.172  Justice Scalia didn’t get it then, and 
perhaps he still doesn’t get it.  But Justice Ginsburg does get it, as she 
proved in Virginia.  It is thus especially unfortunate that she did not 
return to these themes in Heller as additional support for the idea that 
there is indeed a general right of Americans to serve equally in the 
military, regardless of race or sex.173 
III.  BEYOND THE COURT: OBAMA 
In 1990, Barack Obama became President of the Harvard Law Re-
view.  Now he seeks to become nothing less than President of the 
United States. 
In the immediate aftermath of Heller, Senator Obama spoke fa-
vorably about a right to own a gun for self-protection, but he spoke 
with apparent reference to the Second Amendment and without men-
tioning the Fourteenth.174  It would be unfair to expect an elaborate 
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 169 See id. 
 170 See supra section I.B.2. 
 171 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2794–98 & n.16.  Here again we see Justice Scalia’s focus on ob-
jects, such as guns,  as distinct from social structures, such as the military or the polity. 
 172 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520. 
 173 Or, dare I say, sexual orientation.  For this vision to become fully plausible to jurists, it may 
well be necessary for a social movement to endorse and publicize this egalitarian understanding of 
the Second and Nineteenth Amendments.  On the general significance of social movements, see 
Siegel, supra note 160. 
 174 See, e.g., Posting of Lisa Tozzi to The Caucus: The New York Times Politics Blog, http:// 
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/candidates-react-to-supreme-courts-gun-ruling/ (June 28, 
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scholarly exposition when the Senator’s most pressing task was to get 
himself elected.  But the Constitution is not merely what judges say it 
is, and well-trained lawyers outside the judiciary, such as Barack 
Obama, should not feel shy about participating in the constitutional 
conversation. 
Thankfully, Senator Obama has not generally felt shy.  Earlier in 
his campaign, he wrote and delivered a historic speech at the National 
Constitution Center.  Speaking about race in America, the Senator did 
an extraordinary job of integrating Founding and Reconstruction 
themes into an epic constitutional narrative.175 
Senator Obama’s very candidacy is a powerful embodiment of a 
Reconstruction vision in which blacks, under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, would be full political equals with a right to vote and to be 
voted for on the same terms as whites.176  Indeed, Barack Obama’s 
very existence as a natural-born child of a white American-citizen 
mother and a black African-immigrant father is a testament to Recon-
struction; Founding-era legislation opened the naturalization process 
only to foreign-born whites, leaving it to the Fourteenth Amendment 
and its companion statutes to open the way for a more racially inclu-
sive naturalization system.177 
A President Obama might well have a unique opportunity to undo 
some of the damage done by the HLR tradition.  Perhaps better than 
any previous scholar, lawyer, or judge, he may be able to help his fel-
low citizens see the Reconstruction Amendments in their proper place: 
at the center, rather than the periphery, of the unfolding American 
epic.  All this should come quite naturally for a President Obama, 
given the themes of his remarkable career.  The Reconstruction 
Amendments offer Americans a more universally inclusive vision than 
the Founding-obsessed sagas that still hold sway in so many venues.  
It will also be easier to achieve a genuine narrative of national recon-
ciliation once we widen our focus beyond the Founders, many of 
whom were slaveholders or men who accommodated slaveholders.  
And finally, attention to the Reconstruction Amendments can enable 
post-partisan Democrats to give proper credit to the Grand Old Party 
of Lincoln.  Who better to do this than a tall, slim fellow from Illinois 
who also happens to be a gifted constitutional lawyer? 
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